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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on the conduct of perception management (PM) within 
coalitions. Research has alluded to the possibility of predicting human behavior by 
creating stories that convey a believable reality. Further, does PM have any 
organizational process relationship with engagement planning? Target selection? Press 
statement coordination? The thesis focuses on how well coalitions are poised to conduct 
integrated PM operations. It identifies current PM capabilities by studying two recent 
coalition operations and determines how to best coordinate integration efforts. 
The purpose of this study is to analyze various methods of perception 
management and determine how they can be incorporated into current US Information 
Operations. One area of study will be the importance of credibility of our leaders when 
placed in a position of authority. This study will show that credibility is one of the 
toughest factors to achieve. A second area of study will be the value of story telling in 
gaining populace support and validation for intervening in conflicts that require the use of 
force and soldiers. As Stephen Pease said, "the message must be believable, though not 
necessarily true." (Stephen Pease 1950) 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
There are three sides to every story—yours, mine, and what really 
happened." 
-COL Bryan N. Karabaich, USA 
Many of the elements of Information Operations (10) have been used for some 
time, but 10 as a recognized US military strategy is relatively new. The military has been 
trying to integrate the disparate functional areas of 10 into a cogent strategy. Information 
operations are used to affect the flow and content of information to key leaders and 
population groups within the area of operations to ultimately gain information 
superiority. Due to the rising influence of 10, physical destruction is no longer the only 
means of enabling victory in a conflict. A key part of 10, Perception Management (PM), 
is being given increased attention for its possible role in supporting US national 
objectives. Perception Management (PM) focuses on a small piece of the offensive 
component of 10. It may be used to reshape the logic and cognitive processes of 
individuals and can influence group behavior. Professor Dorothy E. Denning suggests 
that PM can even target entire nations for the purpose of influencing that nation's policies 
or the world population with the objective of altering international policy1. If handled 
correctly, PM can be an enabler and force multiplier for 10. However, if handled 
incorrectly, PM can disrupt 10; therefore it is important for military commanders and 
planners to understand how to use this manipulative tool to achieve successful 10 against 
an adversary and gain an operational advantage through information superiority. 
1 Dorothy Elizabeth Denning.  Information Warfare and Security (New York: Addison-Wesley Press 





Disciplines Involved in Perception Management 
Target 
audience 
Public affairs    r-nendly forces: 




Objective: To provide a consistent presentation 
of accurate, balanced, and credible information 
that achieves confidence in forces and operations 
Means: Press releases, briefings, and broadcasts 








Psychological Hostile foreign 
operations military leaders 
(PSYOP) Hostile or neutral 
foreign forces 
Objective: To provide a consistent presentation of 
position and credible information that supports 
friendly objectives 
Means: Civil meetings, press releases, briefings, 
broadcasts (radio, TV, net) 
Objective: To convey selected information and 
indicators to foreign audiences to influence 
emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and 
ultimately, induce behavior to meet objectives 
Means: Projection of truth and credible messages 
via all media 
Objective: to confuse or mislead enemy leaders 
Military Hostile foreign to make decisions that cause actions that are 
deception military leaders exploitable by friendly forces 
Hostile foreign Means: Deceptive operations, activities, or stories 
forces                               to conceal, distort, or falsify indications of friendly 
     intentions, capabilities, or actions 
Figure 1. Disciplines Involved with Perception Management (PM). 
Operational advantage may be achieved by using PM to manipulate the perceived 
environment to alter the story of the conflict, especially for long-range success. It takes 
time and many preparations to project the truth to an individual or group. In order to 
influence an individual or group, the focus of PM should start with subject area expertise, 
especially in long-range 10 planning. Then, using models such as the 10 objectives 
hierarchy2, an Intelligence Officer or planner can construct measures of effectiveness that 
should: (1) cause the enemy to reject their truth, (2) cause them to accept the desired false 
data, and (3) cause them to accept the desired truth and or reject false data. 
2
 CAPT Michael Doyle, "Measures of Merit for Offensive Information Operations Courses of Action" 
Military Operations Research, V5 N2 (2000): 7-8. Retrieved March 28, 2001, from the World Wide Web- 
http//www.mors.org/PubsMOR/Vol52.html. 
The ultimate goal of PM is to convey to potential adversaries, through conscious 
decision-making processes, the commander's ideals in order to achieve the desired 
outcome. The military definition of PM is taken from Joint Publication 1-02. It defines 
PM as information operations that aim to affect the perceptions of others in order to 
influence their emotions, reasoning, decisions, and ultimately actions. Getting into the 
mind of an individual or group is quite difficult, but not impossible. Certain 
psychological tools (e.g., deep techniques, liking, authority, social proof, etc.) have 
proven to be effective influencing practices3. To measure the effectiveness of these 
psychological tools, the author will focus on the 10 objectives hierarchy.4 Using the 10 
objectives and psychological references, commanders and planners will be able to create 
a story or a frame with set boundaries of any situation. In this way, they will be able to 
change or influence the construction of an individual or group's reality to the point of 
causing them to react in a predetermined manner to the event at hand. To learn to use 
PM, one must understand human cognitive processing of information. 
The way in which the human brain has evolved seems to optimize it for telling 
stories. Cognitive psychology and human factors establish frameworks that explain how 
people understand and use information. Sources attempt to put a "spin" on information 
to make their organization look better or emphasize a particular perspective. 
Psychologists define perception as a process of inferences in which people 
construct their own version of reality based on information provided through the five 
senses.   They believe that an individual's perception is influenced by past experience, 
1 See definition of terms as well as books written by Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of 
Persuasion (New York: Quill William Morrow, 1984), 8-9. Self-generated persuasion: induced by group 
discussion, by getting someone to role-play an opponent's position, or by asking a person t imagining a 
course of action. 
4 (Doyle 2000, 7). 
education, cultural values, and role requirements. According to Robert Cialdini, "people 
tend to perceive what they expect to perceive."5 For example, a military intelligence 
officer may be tuned to perceive specific indicators of potential conflict when reviewing 
intelligence. 
This thesis focuses on the actions taken during coalition operations by two 
information rich groups, the military and the mass media. Such actions, whether 
intentional or not, shape perceptions. But how can one organize an information strategy 
for an overall understanding of perception management? Several psychologists believe 
they have the answer; a few of whom, doctors Erving Gofrman, Donald Pennington, 
Robert Cialdini, and Susan Fiske, will be highlighted in this thesis. The overall purpose 
of this study is to define problems associated with conducting PM during coalition 
operations by drawing from the experiences of recent participants. This thesis 
summarizes some of the insights and lessons drawn from two case studies, the 1990-1991 
Persian Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo conflictö. This study will show that despite the 
disparities of culture, perception management in a coalition environment is possible. The 
lessons from the Persian Gulf War and the Kosovo conflict highlight the importance of 
perception management as an element of the information campaign and its ultimate 
importance in conflict resolution. 
5
 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), Chapter 10. See also Chapter 2 of The Central Intelligence Agency 1999 Report: 
"Perception: Why Can't We See What Is There To Be Seen?" Retrieved March 30, 2001, from the World 
Wide Web: http://www.odci.gov/csi/books/19104/art5.html. 
6
 This thesis focuses more on the air portion of the Kosovo conflict, which started in 1999 instead of 
1998. European Command (EUCOM) believed they actually established an 10 cell to support Operation 
Allied Force. There was reluctance on the part of senior commanders to employ 10 since Air Force culture 
is to bomb targets. 
A.       METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL CRITERIA 
Very little has been written about perception management; most literature deals 
with psychology and social cognition. The literature studied for this thesis dealt with 
social cognition. The author examined if some of the literature conclusions applied to 
perception management. Accounts such as Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion by 
Robert B. Cialdini, Social Cognition and Social Perception by Susan T. Fiske, and An 
Essay on the Organization of Experience Frame Analysis and The Presentation of Self in 
Everyday Life by Erving Goffman touch on the issue of approaching perception 
management from the aspect of story telling. The collection of essays by Larry Wentz 
identifies coalition operations lessons learned from Kosovo.7 
A review of the literature indicates most authors agree that (1) perception defines 
an individual or group's reality, (2) anyone's perception is vulnerable and is susceptible 
to attack, and (3) everyone lives by rules and principles which guide one toward 
understanding the meaning of experienced events. The two case studies, the 1990-1991 
Persian Gulf War and the 1998 Kosovo Conflict, were chosen because they represent 
recent coalition operations and showcase US involvement with two completely different 
cultures. With two different cultures, the author intends to show that when handled 
correctly, perception management, regardless of cultural and social differences, is still a 
manipulative tool that can be used to ones own operational and strategic advantage. 
7
 Larry K. Wentz Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR experience (Vienna, VA: CCRP National Defense 
University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997) discusses some 10 aspects. Mr. Wentz is an 
independent consultant on contract to ASD C3I C4ISR Cooperative Research Program to produce a book 
on "Lessons from Kosovo" (hot yet published) which addresses IO use in peace operations. He has 
extensive experience in NATO C3 and C4I support to Coalition Joint Task Force operations, including 
leading a number of Lessons Learned Studies for operations such as Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and 
Restore Hope. Also, Mr. Wentz authored a chapter pertaining to IO in two other books: Alan D. Campen 
CYBERWAR: Security, Strategy, and conflict in the information age (Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International 
Press) and Alan D. Campen The first Information War: the story of communications, computers, and 
intelligence systems in the Persian Gulf War (Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1992). 
Perception management targets will be the same, the enemy commander or the 
morale of the enemy soldiers or the local population. The enemy will attempt to apply 
propaganda against either the US Armed Forces or the civilian population. There will be 
political actions taken in the form of demonstrations, protests, petitions, strikes, boycotts, 
violence, embargo, violence against people, etc. There will be attempts to apply covert 
influence in the form of clandestine broadcasting, forensics, disinformation, covert press 
activities, and website control, photo image manipulation, and staged events. 
The goal of perception management, whether the US is operating on its own or in 
a coalition, is to erode, reduce, or eliminate the enemy's capability to fight or resist. This 
can be done in several ways: impede maneuver, demoralize the enemy forces, discredit 
the enemy's military, create doubt or confusion, inundate the commander's decision 
cycle, create dissention, polarize, and/or distract the enemy from attaining its goals. 
Edward Waltz described three levels of 10: level one-perceptual level; level two- 
--information structure level; and level three-physical level. According to the 
operational model of Information Operations, perception management occurs at level 
one». The model recognizes that targets exist in (1) physical space, (2) cyberspace, and 
(3) the minds of humans. At level one, the goal is to aim at the management of the 
perception of a target audience. At this level, the strategic objective defines the desired 
actions of the target and the perception(s) that will most likely cause those actions. In the 
case of the Persian Gulf War, the desired action for the US coalition was to reverse an act 
of Iraqi aggression. The Coalition's main perception objective regarding Saddam 
Hussein was to promote a loss of Iraqi popular and military support and a loss of political 
8 Edward Waltz, Information Warfare: Principles and Operations (Boston: Artech House, 1998), 148- 
149. See Figure (2). 
control. Of course, these perception objectives may be achieved by a variety of physical 
or virtual means with the ultimate objective of influencing the operational behavior of the 
target audience. 
Attacker JSSSäSm Target p»* 










Info weapons X" 
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a fa fi 
Physical, electromagnetic weapons 
Figure 2. Operational Model of Information Operations (10). 
Waltz feels that the highest-level target of 10 is in the human perception of 
decision makers, policymakers, military commanders, and even entire populations. In his 
opinion, and the author agrees, the ultimate targets and the operational objective is to 
influence enemy perception which will in turn, affect their decisions and resulting 
activities.    The situation requiring perception management will either be ad hoc or 
unexpected, event driven, crisis-driven, or long-term.   Any medium can be exploited, 
7 
including  face-to-face   communications,  print,   telecommunications,   broadcast,   and 
computer networks^. 
MILITARY PSYOP-- 
"TOOLS OF THE TRADE" 
TELEVISION **~ '■ 
 . >.  
RADIO 








TACTICAL OPERATIONAL STRATEGI 
(UMITED SCOPE) (THEATER IMPLICATIONS) (INTERNATIONAL) 
PSYOP Tools Today 
Figure 3. PSYOP Tools Used Today. 
This study does not judge the reasons why the United States decided to enter these 
conflicts, rather, it examines the methods used to control the adversary's perception of 
the conflict and it identifies the theoretical framework used by the author to determine the 
feasibility of managing an individual or group's perception.   The case studies examine 
9
 See Figure 3. 
the success or failure of US usage of perception management in their coalition operations 
by exploring rules used when agencies within the US are required to interface^. 
Finally, it draws conclusions as to: (1) the significance of credibility (2) 
appropriateness of target selection (3) effectiveness of press statement coordination; (4) 
the importance of storytelling; and (5) whether or not it is possible to integrate PM with 
coalition operations. 
B.        DEFINITION OF TERMS 
• Authority: Professor Stanley Milgram's study (1964, 1974, 1976) that 
points out people's compulsion to obey those placed in a position of 
authority. There are several kinds of symbols that trigger people's 
compliance in the absence of authority: titles, clothes, and trappings of 
authority. (Cialdini 1984) 
• Campaign: A series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, 
operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational 
objectives within a given time and space. (JS 5-0) 
• Categories of data: In the context of perception management and its 
constituent approaches, data obtained by adversary individuals, groups, 
intelligence systems, and officials. Such data falls into two categories: 
• Indications: Data derived from open sources or from detectable 
actions that adversaries can piece together or interpret to reach 
personal conclusions or official estimates concerning friendly 
intentions, capabilities, or activities. (Joint Pub 1-02 1972) 
• Information: A compilation of data provided by protected or open 
sources that would provide a substantially complete picture of 
friendly intentions, capabilities, or activities. (Joint Pub 1-02 
1972) 
• Deception: Measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, 
distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner 
prejudicial to his interest. (JS Pub 1-02 1972) 
• Defensive Information Operations: Integrate and coordinate policies and 
procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend 
information and information systems. (Joint Pub 1-02 1972) 
1° In general, Joint Publication 3-13, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," dictates that IO should integrate 
early between components, groups, organizations, and agencies involved in planning and execution IO 
actions and activities. Joint Pub 3-13, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," v-4. 
Denouncement: Messages that discredit, defame, demoralize or 
dehumanize an opponent. It is used to draw support away from the 
adversary and toward oneself, to win support for arguments or programs. 
(Toffler 1995) 
Door in the face: This technique allows the manipulator to make a large 
request that is most likely to be rejected and then following it with a 
smaller request. This theory states: "How can I repay my obligation? 
(Cialdini 1984) 
Fabrication: It is subject to discrediting. What was real a moment ago can 
be destroyed. (Goffman 1986) 
Foot-in-the-Door: This technique uses the small/large comparison method 
to persuade individuals to commit themselves in a small way with the 
intention that they will commit themselves further in that direction. 
(Freedman & Karsh 1993) 
Frames: Rules and principles of organization that govern events, 
especially social ones, and our subjective involvement in them. They are 
subject to rework as people move from one frame to another. (Goffman: 
1986) 
Grafalloons: Proud and meaningless associations of human beings 
(Pratkanis and Aronson 1992) 
Information environment: The aggregate of individuals, organizations, or 
systems that collect, process, or disseminate information, including the 
information itself. (Joint Pub 3-13 1998) 
Intelligence: 1. The product of resulting from the collection, processing, 
integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of a available 
information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information or 
knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, 
investigation, analysis, or understanding. (JS Pub 1-02 1972) 
Keying: More creative process where transformation can take place 
through make believe, sporting, games, ritual, experimentation, practice. 
Keying is subject to rekeying. (Goffman 1986) 
Liking: The tendency for humans to like people who are similar to them. 
(Cialdini 1984) 
Military operations other than war (MOOTW): Operations that encompass 
the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short 
of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any 
combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, 
during, and after war. (Joint Pub 1-02 1972) 
Mirror and matching: An extension of modeling theory that advocates that 
if behavior is modeled precisely, it can be duplicated by almost any 
individual (Cialdini 1984) 
10 
Offensive Information Operations: The integrated use of assigned and 
supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, 
to affect adversary decision makers and achieve or promote specific 
objectives. (Joint Pub 3-13 1998) 
Perception (as defined by psychologists): A process of interference in 
which people construct their own version of reality on the basis of 
information provided through the five senses. For ease of recall, the 
categories used by psychologist in defining PM involve five verbs: deny, 
demean, deceive, and divide.   (Denning 1999) 
Perception management (as defined by the military): Actions to convey 
and (or) deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to 
influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning and to 
intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official 
estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions 
favorable to the originator's objectives. In various ways, perception 
management combines truth projection, operations, security, cover, and 
deception, and PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02 1972) 
Psychological Operations: Information Operations that aim to influence 
behavior by affecting the human psyche through fear, desire, logic, and 
other mental factors. (Joint Pub 1-02 1972) 
Rework (defined by two processes): Keying and fabrication. (Goffman: 
1986) 
Rule of reciprocity: The tendency for human beings to feel obligated to 
return a behavior that they have received from another. It is a persuasion 
device that directs thoughts and carries its own motivation to act on those 
thoughts. If the norm is broken, one would likely receive some form of 
social sanction and disapproval. The norm of reciprocity states: "If I do 
something for you, then you are obligated to return the favor and do 
something for me." (Cialdini 1984) 
Scarcity: Making something attractive by making it appear scarce and 
unavailable, by erecting barriers that make the object difficult to obtain. 
(Cialdini, 1984) 
Social Engineering: Operations that trick others into doing something 
they would not do if they knew the truth, for example, giving out a secret 
password or sensitive corporate information. It involves some form of 
impersonation, of either a particular individual or a role. (Denning 1992) 
Stories: Facts, beliefs, desires, affects, and the relationships people draw 
between these. They explain and predict objective reality as well as 
construct, modify, and limit our perception of that reality. (Goffman: 
1986) 
The Commitment and Consistency Rule: A fundamental inducement of 
human behavior is the desire to be consistent in both our actions and our 
11 
thought processes. Commitment is the force that facilitates this 
compliance, as once a position is taken; there is a natural tendency to act 
in manners consistent with that belief (Greenwald, Carnot, Beach, & 
Young, 1987). The consistency rule states "after committing oneself to a 
position, one should be more willing to comply with requests for 
behaviors that are consistent with that position" (Cialidini, 1984). 
C.        SUMMARY 
Theorists of the RMA suggest radical changes in US military operations including 
in coalitions. The United States must not only consider the gap in technology 
advancement, the rules of engagement, and the constraints of war, but also the 
psychological aspect of executing any actions dealing with coalition operations. The use 
of perception management will be a great assistance to winning any war or conflict. 
However, there will always be fogs of war, frictions, and constraints that will inhibit the 
smooth flow of any operation. For this reason, the worst-case scenario must be 
considered and flexibility must be on the forefront of every commander's mind. 
The next chapter compares past and current guidance pertaining to perception 
management and examines internal as well as external influences that affect the 
development of techniques to win in the battle for the best storyteller. 
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II.     THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a 
bodyguard of lies. 
-Winston Churchill 
A.       THE PSYCHOLOGY AND MANAGEABILITY OF PERCEPTION 
The social implication of perception management is that, despite the disparities of 
culture, humans live in a world they assume has a permanent tangible character. This 
means that once an event occurs, a permanent tracing will remain, and with proper 
research and interrogation, a record of the event can be uncovered!!. in turn, perception 
defines reality as seen in the eyes of an individual or group. A manager of perception 
believes that individuals and groups can be influenced without much awareness or 
stirring of events. They achieve this mastery by using certain techniques or cues for 
achieving their objectives. One of these techniques is perception management. Like 
most tools, perception management can be used constructively or destructively. 
Perception management is achieved by manipulating words, images, sounds and 
other sensory aids in the environment in such a manner that a story is created. The 
receiver reconstructs these very words in an attempt to understand the reality of the event. 
Goffman describes the narrative thought process of a human brain as frameworks. 
He points out that all social frameworks involve rules, but differently.12" He asserts that 
11 Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard Press, 1974, reprinted 1986), 288. A social psychologist view on what factors determine when an 
individual or group can be influenced and how one responds to a persuasion attempt. See Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Vulnerabilities. 
humans perceive events and their consequences through frames, whether they are reading 
a story or looking out a window, whether given to them by the social environment and 
culture or from their own experiences.    It is the type of framework employed that 
provides a way of describing the event to which it is applied. Humans classify, organize 
and interpret their life experiences to make sense of them; the perception of what is real is 
inferred from the situation.   The structure of the frame, unlike that of the situation, is 
fixed and not dependent on day-to-day events.  Goffman sees language analogous to the 
14 
rules and syntax of the frame. In any one moment of activity an individual is likely to 
apply several frameworks^. An individual perception of an event creates inherent biases 
that shape or slant events to fit their reality. He suggests that perception should be 
viewed as a form of contact and communication. In this form, control is established over 
what is perceived, over contact that is made, and this limits and regulates what is shown 
as a limitation and regulation of contact^. 
Goffman states that the mind's center of gravity (COG) or point of view forms a 
context for what is experienced. This COG describes the primary frameworks of an 
individual or a specific social group's central cultural element or schemata. The 
perspective from which an individual or group attack a problem could be called the 
context or perceptual set. Changing that individual or group's perspective of a problem 
could be called "refraining," which is a very useful way to look at things from new 
perspectives. 
How humans perceive history, and even their own reality, depends on the kind of 
story they tell others or what they tell themselves. In fact, humans' early judgments often 
adversely affect the formation of future perceptions. Once an observer thinks he or she 
knows what is happening, this perception tends to resist change and in turn, creates 
perceptual biases. Another term for this techniques is mirror imaging. Goffman defines 
actual scenes as events that present themselves through multiple channels or frames15. 
13 Ibid., p. 25. 
14 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Anchor Books, 1959), 67. 
15 ibid., p. 146. 
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Frames provide the rules and principles, which guide one towards understanding 
the meaning of experienced events 16. Since frames are built on structural rules, they are 
predictable and recurring. They are vulnerable because they define a close, finite set of 
rules about social life. Goffman points out that these channels are one person's reality 
and that they may be totally different from what is really happening. In order to 
distinguish one reality from the other, the individual or group needs to apply different 
techniques. 
There are a myriad of techniques used to influence one's perception. One set of 
them is called the "deep techniques." They are considered "deep" in that they are 
applied below the surface of ones cognitive awareness and are done without the "critical 
awareness of those at their receiving end' 1. An example of a deep technique is to subtly 
ask questions to direct or control a conversation, or to dominate or manipulate another. 
According to Frederick Mann and Russell Thomas, some people are in the habit of 
automatically trying to answer questions put to them. In this context, the exploiters take 
advantage of the situation and create a frame of questions that will manipulate the 
conversation. 
The role of perception management is to influence the perception of human minds 
(both individually and as a group) to provide an advantage in crisis or conflict by 
influencing the human will with a minimal use of physical force. As Sun Tzu states, 
people should use any tools  available to "break the enemy's resistance without 
!6 (Goffinan 1986, 247). 
17
 Frederick Mann and Russell Thomas. "The Anatomy of Deep Techniques—Part I." Retrieved June 
18, 2001, from the World Wide Web: http://www.buildfreedom.com/tl/tll20a.html. 
16 
fighting."18 The role of perception management will be determined by the context of the 
conflict, meaning the use of necessary tools to counter the adversary's use of perception 
management. Technology has provided some new tools. It is the manner in which these 
tools are used that will define the effectiveness of perception management. 
Perception is organized by what an individual or group expects to perceive as well 
as by the context in which it occurs. Different circumstances evoke different sets of 
expectations. Humans form patterns or frames of expectation that are deeply embedded 
to influence perceptions, even when people are alerted to and try to take account of the 
existences of data that do not fit their perceptions. This is often called wishful thinking. 
How can this knowledge be applied to obtain successful management of an 
individual's or group's culture? The information model of warfare is a good start19. As 
Edward Waltz puts it, " it is important to understand the role of information in conflict at 
the basic functional level20" and to understanding the flow of information from the 
physical domain to the perceptual domain, in which the human mind is the central 
element. Society and its natural socialization process has trained people what not to see, 
limited their consciousness, perspectives, and brain's construction of reality. Technology 
has made this process faster and easier to develop in society. 
18
 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans, by Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 
236. 
19
 See Figure 5. 
20
 Edward Waltz, Information Warfare: Principles and Operations (Boston: Artech House, 1998), 4-8. 
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Figure 5. Information Model of Warfare. 
Technology has made the informational, perceptual, and physical domains 
vulnerable to attacks that do not require physical force alone.    It has become the 
preeminent means by which military and political decision makers perceive the world, 
develop beliefs about the conflict, and command their forces. It allows leaders to instill 
these beliefs or stories in people's lives using psychological techniques such as Cialdini's 
"social proof." According to Cialdini, this weapon of influence provides a shortcut for 
determining how to behave, but, at the same time, makes one who uses the shortcut 
vulnerable to the attacks of profiteers who lie in wait along its path.  "Social proof is 
influential under two conditions: (1) Uncertainty (when people are unsure, when the 
situation is ambiguous, they are more likely to attend to actions of others and to accept 
those actions as correct) and (2) Similarity (people are more inclined to follow the lead of 
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similar others).2i  This is where perception management is essential to the success of an 
information operations campaign. 
Information operations are, to a great degree, about perception management. 
Military commanders and planners have to know and understand their own perception(s) 
as well as the enemy's perception. Most important, they must understand the opponent's 
perception of them, the enemy's perception of: himself, his environment, the perception 
of their adversary's perception, the nature of the conflict, and many other factors that 
influence perception (e.g., life, death, etc). To even come close to understanding the 
opponent's perception, commanders and PM planners must avoid installing their own 
perceptual biases since they prevent them from seeing the situation objectively. To help 
them, commanders and PM planners should collaborate with country experts. These 
experts will ensure that there is no misconception or interpretation of cultural standards. 
Manipulators are always attacking the context or perceptual set from which an 
individual or group draws conclusions about an event. Goffman suggests that perception 
managers look at everything using different frames. In doing so, one's perception or 
construction of reality is less contaminated with bias and false information. It is 
imperative to be conscious of and open to the perspective or perceptual set used. 
Joint Publication 1-02 defines vulnerability as: (1) the susceptibility of a nation or 
force to any action by any means through which its war potential or combat effectiveness 
may be reduced or its will to fight diminished. (2) The characteristics of a system which 
cause it to suffer a definite regression (incapability to perform the designated mission) as 
21 Robert B. Cialdini, Ph.D., Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (New York: William Morrow, 
1993), pp. 130-136. 
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a result of having been subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural (manmade) 
hostile environment22. 
Another condition, which leads to automatic responses, is the term "authority." 
According to Cialdini, "authority" describes the acceptance of leaders or position. 
Society will automatically accept the words or story of this "authority." People are 
generally taught that people of authority know best and should be obeyed in most 
matters. By accepting the words of the "authority", people create shortcuts in our 
constructive building of people and events. Shortcuts eventually lead to subconscious 
thinking and automatic responses. 
Cialdini points out another component that greatly affects human perception, the 
contrast principle; a "nice little weapon of influence" that is virtually undetectable23." He 
points out that anything can be seen very differently, depending on the nature of the event 
that precedes it. 
With the contrast principle, Cialdini points out that despite cultural and political 
differences, everyone possesses cognitive bias, the basis of liking or accepting data into 
reality. In a way, humans create their own stories and biases of events occurring around 
them. 
As Cialdini puts it, there are three basic biases. First, there is the "hot" or 
"motivated" bias that accepts things as they are. Second, there is "cold" or 
"confirmation" bias. This bias occurs when a person holds or is told that a certain piece 
of information is "true." When confronted with conflicting information or evidence the 
22
 Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary of Military and Associated term, Joint Publication 1-02 
Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), (Washington, D.C., 03 January 1972), A-15. 
23 (Cialdini 1984, 13). 
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person is quick to disagree or dismiss the information. People who are stuck in a 
"confirmation bias" type of mode will only look for information that confirms what they 
already know. In the process of finding their reality, they blind themselves to 
information that would conflict with their current frame of information. Finally, there is 
the "expectation bias" which is when people see what they expect to or believe they see. 
A classic example is the painting of the Young Woman/Old Woman where ambiguous 
patterns are examples of two-state, bimodal systems in psychology^ 
Figure 6. Young Woman/Old Woman. 
When the human brain perceives ambiguous figures, like the old woman, the 
perception switches between two interpretations, namely "old woman" or "young 
24 Charles F. Schmidt. "Young Woman or Old Woman." This picture was originally published in 
Puck magazine in 1915 as a cartoon entitled "My Wife and My Mother-in-law." The old woman's nose, 
mouth, and eye are, respectively, the young woman's chin, necklace, and ear. Retrieved on June 22,2001, 
http://www-rci.rutgers.edu/~cfs/305 html/Gestalt/Illusions.html#anchorl337965 from the World Wide 
Web. See Figure 6. 
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woman"  because  it  is   difficult  for  the  brain  to  recognize  both  interpretations 
simultaneously. 
Pratkins and Aronson, supporters of Cialdini, used the term "granfalloon" to 
explain another tool of perception management, the art of persuasion. Granfalloon is 
similar to Cialdini's similarity principle in that it seeks multiple cues to bring things into 
liking. Granfalloons are proud and meaningless associations of human beings. This 
means one individual could pass another on the street in America and say "hello" and not 
receive a response. However, when placed in a foreign country, that "hello" is readily 
welcomed since the two share the same nationality25. 
During the Persian Gulf conflict, OPERATION DESERT SHIELD, one coalition 
leaflet used the "granfalloon" technique in depicting the unity of coalition forces26. In 
PS YOP, leaflets are nothing but a sheet of paper that attempts to convey a message27. 
The message could be in the form of a drawing, picture, or writing. Coalition perception 
management planners hoped that the pictures and words would remind the Iraqi soldiers 
about brotherly love. The leaflets reminded the soldiers that "we are brothers, neighbors" 
and for them to stop their plundering of innocent lives. 
25
 Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson. Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of 
Persuasion (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1992), 168. 
26 Psywarrior "The Gulf War" Retrieved on April 22, 2001, from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.pipeline.com/~psywarrior/gulfl .html. See Figures 7 through 9. Figure 7 illustrated Gulf War 
PSYOP leaflet portrays King Fahd of Saudi Arabia as wanting all Arabs to live together in peace as 
brothers while Saddam Hussein thinks of Kuwait, war and death. Figure 8 illustrated Gulf War PSYOP 
leaflet portrays the Iraqi soldier thinking. 
27 Psywarrior. "The Gulf War." Retrieved April 21, 2001, from the World Wide Wed: 
http://www.pipeline.com/~psywarrior/gulfl.html. 
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Live Together In Peace Not War 
"We are all brothers... 
neighbor Arabs.... 
we want peace 
Do You Really Want To Die? 
Figure 7. Brotherhood Leaflet. 
"Staying Here Means Death " 
Figure 8. Surrender Leaflet Sample. 
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Susan Fiske points out that people think about each other and events as well as the 
comprehension of things the same way that they understand stories. This means that 
people do not understand individual objects and actions in isolation but rather the 
ongoing and dynamic relations between objects in a particular holistic context or frame of 
reference. Fiske goes on to say that comprehension is not "merely perception, but 
explanation about what is happening and/or what will happen."28 
Perception is closely related to memory in that they are both constructive, based 
particularly on cues (reminders in the current environment), expectations and one's 
objective in perceiving and remembering. These constructions are shared social and 
cultural derivations as well as individual constructions. Many of them are automatic, 
meaning humans tend to do them without thinking about them. As a result, they are 
accurate enough in most cases. However, unlike memory, humans are not always 
capable of determining the source of their constructions and re-constructions. They 
struggle with the thought, did they perceive the event as they remember or did they add 
or delete things to get a better fit to their expectations about such events. As a result, 
perception is left vulnerable and subject to manipulation2?. 
To overcome the vulnerability of thoughts, knowledge of the situation must be 
compared in different frames. Much of human knowledge is in the form of words. As 
Frederick Mann and Thomas Russell put it, "language is one of the fundamental ways our 
brains create our reality construction."30 They believe that the use of words distorts the 
28 Susan T. Fiske, "Social Cognition and Social Perception." Annual Review of Psychology, 44 
(1993): 155-194. 
29 ibid. 
30 (Mann and Russell 1996, 22). 
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brains' "reality construction since people create meaning of words and inevitably, certain 
expectations." 
In an effort to understand Saddam Hussein's use of words, Paul K. Davis and 
John Arquilla developed two alternative models3i. These models attempt to assess 
Saddam Hussein's perception and the reasoning behind his actions against Kuwait. 
According to doctors Arquilla and Davis, the idea behind these three models is that "one 
forms a strong mental image of how the subject may reason; clarifies and communicates 
this image with descriptions, diagrams, and anecdotes; then proceeds directly to 
judgements about how the subject would reason on particular issues."32 The study refers 
to Goffman's use of multiple frames. It applies an experimental methodology for 
understanding the possible reasoning of opponents in crisis and conflict and for using that 
understanding to develop adaptive deterrent strategies. The 1991 Davis and Arquilla 
study attempted to explain Saddam's behavior retrospectively, using alternative models. 
This model analyzed speculative questions such as "could we have deterred Saddam?"33 
According to Davis and Arquilla, a different set of two or three models is needed for 
different crisis situations. In the case of Saddam Hussein, the model is focused on an 
individual, not one requiring the perception of group decision making by consensus. In 
developing these models, Davis and Arquilla emphasize cognitive maps that attempt to 
diagram how someone connects ideas (i.e., "what's on his mind"). 
31 See Figure 9. 
32 Paul K. Davis and John Arquilla. Deterring or Coercing Opponents in Crisis: Lessons from the War 
with Saddam Hussein. (Santa Monica, California: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1991), 11. 
33 (Davis & Arquilla, 1991, V). According to Davis and Arquilla, a different set of two or three 
models is needed for different crisis situations. In the case of Saddam Hussein, the model is focused on an 
individual not one requiring the perception of group decision making by consensus, 15. 
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Models of Saddam Hussein's Actions. 
The Davis and Arquilla approach to creating models includes three "borders" or 
"frames": (1) assume that policymakers do not make decisions "randomly," but instead 
follow a relatively coherent and consistent logic; (2) some plausible types of models 
simply do not apply in particular cases; (3) conduct sensitivity analysis at crucial points 
in the analysis.   According to them, this approach is "potentially true."34   In their 
34 ibid, 12. 
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opinions, truth may be a combination of their models because real human beings often 
have competing personas that dominate under different circumstances. 
Donald Pennington's model states that almost all of cognitive communication can 
be taken via storytelling. He focused on the term schema to characterize a knowledge 
structure. He believed that social Schemas are important for understanding how people 
represent their social world. He used another term to further define his theory on social 
Schemas, "false consensus effect" where humans define their social interaction with 
everyone based on their interaction with their friends/partners, who by and large have 
similar views to their own35. He goes on to say that humans will always have self- 
contained biases because their own attitudes, opinions and beliefs will be "highly salient 
and at the forefront" of their mind. Another term, social perception, further defines 
people's interaction with others as a process that everyone goes through in search of 
understanding other persons. In short, Pennington points out some key features of the 
role social schemas play in social cognition. It enables efficient coding, influences what 
to pay attention to and what to ignore, influences what is remembered, consistent 
information stored, inconsistent forgotten, and influence impression formation and 
judgments of people. But, this approach may lead to error or bias. 
Pennington also focused on the term "cognitive miser" to reflect the fact that 
people have a limited capacity to process social information and take shortcuts to develop 
simple rules to use where possible.36 This theory is supported by three important 
heuristics: availability, anchoring and adjustment, and representatives. Pennington points 
35 Donald Pennington Social Cognition  (Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis Inc., 2000), pp. 47,62, 55- 
60,79. 
36 ibid., p. 79. 
27 
out that the availability heuristic reflects humans' experience of the world and may lead 
to erroneous or biased inferences or judgments because of this. 
B.        MANAGING PERCEPTION THROUGH STORYTELLING 
Storytelling is an ancient medium for communication and meaning making. It is a 
process that can nurture and create meaning or reinforce control and manipulate meaning. 
Short stories and storytelling can easily be used in the interest of perception management. 
Drawing on the history of influence and the cognitive psychology approach, the manner 
in which a situation involving individuals or groups is controlled and described can 
influence its eventual outcome. In the end, the story matters. 
The cognitive response approach has given one of the most important rules for 
determining the effectiveness of a persuasive tactic. According to Anthony Pratkanis, 
and Elliot Aronson, the persuasion tactic directs and channels thoughts so that the target 
thinks in a manner agreeable to the communicator's point-of-view37. Erving Goffman 
believes that the way humans think about people and events as well as comprehend 
people and events are the same way that they understand stories. When humans talk or 
write, they are, in a way, writing a story so that their listener or reader can comprehend 
their ideas. In Goffman's opinion, participants pursue a line of activity, a storyline, 
across a range of events38. Humans think by relating or elaborating concepts in story-like 
explanations. 
Different cultures provide different stories that may result in very different 
perceptions. A military commander or planner must take this into consideration when 
attempting to control a particular individual or group.    Fiske believes that stories 
37
 (Pratkanis, and Aronson 1992,24). 
38(Goffmanl959,201). 
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construct, modify and limit humans' perceptions ofthat reality. Objective events happen 
to humans in the world, but how they put these episodes together, interpret them and 
make them coherent determines their perception of them. For example, in order to 
remember all the Presidents of the United States, a student will use cues or mnemonics to 
recall a particular President and his significance in history. For example, to remember 
the fourth President of the United States, a student may find a word that rhymes with 
four. Another example is the various interpretations of the discovery of the Americas, 
which can be viewed as a story of valiant pioneers against a hostile wilderness or as a 
barbaric invasion, exploitation, and hemisphere-wide slaughter. 
The rule of story telling is quite simple. According to Joint Publication 3-58, the 
story must be believable, verifiable, consistent, and executable39. Often, the simple 
reporting of facts or their appearance can have an effect. For example, on Halloween 
night, in 1938, Orson Welles and the Mercury Theater Radio Company broadcast a 
dramatization of H.G. Wells' famous tale "War of the Worlds" which recounted a 
Martian invasion of the Earth. The adaptation includes realistic radio news bulletins 
informing listeners of the developing saga. A music program was interrupted to brief 
listeners that an alien object had landed in Grover's Mill, New Jersey. 
Wells' novel was written in response to several historical events. The most 
important was the unification and militarization of Germany, which led to a series of 
novels predicting war in Europe. Most of these were written in a semi-documentary 
fashion; and Wells borrowed their technique to tie his interplanetary war tale to specific 
places in England familiar to his readers. This attempt at hyperrealism helped to inspire 
39 Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, Joint Pub 3-58, (Joint activities reporting to the Chairman 
(JCS), (Washington, D.C., 31 May 1996), A-2. 
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Orson Welles when he latter created his famed 1938 radio broadcast based on the novel. 
The broadcast was his attempt to introduce a different way of broadcasting. Despite 
periodic interruptions of the broadcast to inform listeners of the dramatization, it 
produced panic in many parts of the state. 
The whole episode illustrates a number of things about mass psychology, but also 
the willingness of people to believe that humans are not alone in the universe. This 
broadcast also brings to mind the first chapter of Wells' novel. It asked the questions: 
From what perspective is humanity viewed? What qualities in the Martians make them 
dangerous to humanity? Wells several times draws parallels between the Martians' 
treatment of the Earth and Britain's treatment of its colonies. The two case studies will 
point out this technique of contrasting two dramatic characters and events4*). In today's 
technology, the comparison is easily made with the help of the Internet. Advances in 
information technology are providing rapidly increasing number of individuals with more 
access to information at lower cost. However, technology does not explain spontaneity 
that penetrates our social world and reframes our current frames (e.g., television with its 
ready-made framing packages). 
C.        SUMMARY 
Humans interpret the world and each other in terms of a stable set of stories, 
which can easily fit into events. Stories are made up of facts, beliefs, and desires, and 
affect the relationships individuals draw between these. Fiske and Taylor provide 
extensive coverage of social Schemas in terms of what they are, what they do and how 
they relate to self".   They believe that the "self or "point of view" is the dynamic, 
40
 The contrast principle is discussed in detail in Cialdini's book Influence: The Psychology of 
Persuasion. 
41
 Susan T. Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition, 2nd edn. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
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narrative center of gravity around which these relationships form a context for human 
experience. Therefore, how humans perceive themselves, their history, and those around 
them, depends in part on the kind of story told, or what stories others relate. 
Goffman explains that an individual's or group's view is distorted if an individual 
uses only one frame. Cialdini describes this process as single cueing. He, like Goffman, 
encourages the reader to use multiple cueing to frame their reality. For example, the 
perceptions and viewpoints of a preacher and a politician on the topic of religion are 
often different. He encourages the use of many frames to organize a form of reality or 
knowledge through a transformation process of viewing. Everything should be seen in 
the context of four perspectives42. In his expert opinion, all events in society can be 
contained and managed within the conventional system of beliefs. 
Pennington defines social perception as the process through which an individual 
or group seeks to know and understand other people. Social Schemas are cognitive 
structures, which represent knowledge about people and social situations. They are 
organized collections of knowledge stored in memory and based on past experience. 
Social Schemas determine how information is encoded and help to process new 
information quickly. 
1991),16. 
42 (Goffman 1959, 240). First, it may be viewed "technically," in terms of its efficiency and 
inefficiency as intentionally organized system of activity for the achievement of predefined objectives. 
Second, everything may be viewed as "politically," in terms of the actions which each participant (or class 
participants) can demand of other participants, the kinds of deprivation and indulgences which can be 
meted out in order to enforce these demands, and the kinds of social controls which guide this exercise of 
command and use of sanctions. Third, everything can be viewed "structurally," in terms of the horizontal 
and vertical status divisions and the kinds of social relations, which relate these several groupings to one 
another. Finally, everything could be viewed "culturally," in terms of the moral values which influence 
activity in the establishment-values pertaining to fashions, customs, etc 
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One of the many rewards of mastering the tool of perception management is an 
acute conscious awareness of events. It is a powerful tool of influence when used 
(consciously or subconsciously) correctly. Like the deep technique, the management of 
perception enables an exploiter to manipulate any individual or group with the use of 
adequate information and some basic psychological techniques. In Robert Cialdini's 
words, "everyone is vulnerable to manipulation. "43 
To understand fully the nature of this vulnerability, Robert Cialdini encourages 
people to observe the work of the ethnologist. Upon inspection, he points out that 
humans have automatic responses, which are developed from psychological principles, or 
stereotypes they have learned to accept44. Cialdini believes that everyone can be 
triggered to automatically respond to a situation with the use of words or images that 
engage a strong psychological principle45. Besides these components of automatic 
response, Cialdini goes on to say that in the process of using automatic influence, the 
exploiters need hardly strain a muscle to get their way. It seems that perception 
management is a tool of mental perseverance rather than physical fortitude. The key to 
influencing an individual's or group's perception is "to trigger the great stores of 
influence that already exist in the situation and direct them toward the intended target.46 
Perception management, when thoroughly researched, can reduce damage to coalition 
forces. As former Secretary of Defense, William Perry stated, information operations in 
its entirety, made a drastic impact on how America fought the Persian Gulf War. General 
43 (Cialdini 1984, 14). 
44 (Cialdini 1984, 8-9). Self-generated persuasion: induced by group discussion, by getting someone to 
role-play an opponent's position, or by asking a person t imagining a course of action. 
45 (Cialdini 1984, 10). 
46 ibid., p. 11 
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Schwarzkopf, also an avid supporter of perception management, stressed the importance 
of integrating PYSOP into the coalition military plan. The efforts demonstrated that 
"information operations can determine a mission's success."47 
The next two chapters examine a recent US coalition operation by assessing 
military operations in The Gulf War and in the Kosovo conflict. 
47
 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, JCS, 03 January 1972), 
introduction. 
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III.    PERSIAN GULF CASE STUDY 
The real target in war is the mind of the enemy command, not the bodies 
of his troops. If we operate against his troops it is fundamentally for the 
effect that action will produce on the mind and will of the commander. 
Captain Sir Basil Liddel Hart 
Thoughts on War, 1944 
A.       RELEVANT USE OF PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT 
The 1990-91 Persian Gulf War was a war of carefully constructed words, as much 
as it was a war of high-tech weaponry. Both the coalition and Iraqi authorities used 
perception management to convey their purpose in the Gulf. Both conflicts were event- 
driven and close to the end, crisis driven. One methods used to win the perception 
management campaign was the negative deep technique. According to Frederick Mann 
and Russell Thomas, people using negative deep technique claim to be "authorities.48" 
Political leaders and many other national leaders in the region with "authority" 
had one thing in common; they all attempted to frame the perception of events during the 
war. They used the mass media to ignite, structure, frame, and exploit latent ethnic 
hatred in hopes of skewing information about the reality of the war. As Captain Frank 
Petho, USN, once said, "words are like symbols bounded by rationality."^ The 
arrangement of words means a difference in keeping something in memory for long 
period. In other words, people have limited long term memory. They forget details and 
48 Frederick Mann and Russell Thomas "The Anatomy of Deep Techniques-Part I."   Retrieved June 18, 2001, 
from the World Wide Web: http://www.buildfreedom.com/tl/tll20a.shtml. 
49
 Captain Frank Petho, USN, Chairman, NSA Dept.    Lecture, course on Human factors in Information 
Operations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 24 June 2000. 
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logic collapses. In an attempt to rebuild or reconstruct that memory, the missing data can 
be provided with the help of the perception manager. 
B.        GULF WAR BACKGROUND 
On August 2, 1990, the armed forces of Iraq launched an attack against Kuwait. 
The United States and Kuwait called for an emergency session of the United Nations 
Security Council in an effort to stop "this blatant use of military aggression."50 The 
United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 660, condemning the 
invasion and demanding that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally. The 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed several resolutions (UNSR) pertaining 
to the situation in Kuwait^. 
Iraq not only refused to leave but also held foreign nationals hostage. As time 
passed, and with no results from their earlier warnings, the UNSC passed Resolution 662 
and 664 in hopes of coming to a peaceful resolution.52 At four o'clock in the morning of 
February 21, 1991, the United States Central Command in Saudi Arabia led a coalition of 
forces from thirty countries in a massive ground, naval, and air offensive with the 
declared intention of ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait. 
It was reported that about a million women, children, and old people fled in terror 
toward Turkey and Iran, seeking safety from chemical bombs and the vengeful framing 
50 UN SCOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 2, 2932d mtg. At 13, UN Doc. A/46/2 (1990) (statement of United States 
Ambassador Pickering). President Bush referred to the Iraqi attack as "naked aggression," "Invading Iraqis Seize 
Kuwait and Its Oil: US Condemns Attack, Urges United Action," NY Times, Aug 3, 1990, at Al, and "vicious 
aggression" by "international outlaws and renegades." "The Iraqi Invasion," NY Times, Aug. 6 1990, at A7. 
51
 See table 1. Chronology complied from The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, M. Sifry and C. 
Christopher, eds. (New York: Times Books, 1991); K. Matthews, The Gulf Conflict and International Relations (New 
York: Routledge, 1993); G. H. W. Bush and B. Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998); and 
Retrieved June 18,2001, from the World Wide Web: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/cron. 
52
 Saddam declared Kuwait "a comprehensive and eternal merger." Resolution 662 declared the annexation null 
and void. Resolution 664 demanded the immediate release of all foreign nationals. A total of eleven Council 
resolutions were passed to no avail. 
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of one man's attempt to cleanse his country of anti-Saddam Hussein compatriots. The 
massive violation of human rights was so great that President Bush, who had compared 
Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler, was compelled to intervene further with the remaining 
American troops. After 100 hours of ground war, the Iraqi army fled or surrendered to 
"the largest single allied military offensive since World War II."53 
One could conclude that Model Two of the Davis and Arquilla study describe 
actions taken by Saddam Hussein.54 Model Two sees Saddam Hussein as cold, ruthless, 
calculating, and pragmatic. 
C.       KUWAITI PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN 
Kuwait aimed its perception management toward the Kuwaiti population, the 
United Nations, and towards the United States leaders and population. They told the 
story of complete devastation and helplessness. They reinforced the perception that 
"Iraqi occupation forces were savagely intensifying their inhumane practices against 
innocent civilians in Kuwait," killing people in the streets, burning homes, and 
committing other atrocities such as murder, rape, plunder, and torture. 
1. Kuwaiti Perception Management Tools 
To create a credible story, Kuwaiti authorities detailed these atrocities via 
submission reports and videotapes presented to the Council. The royal family of Kuwait 
framed events and stories of "the horror" being forced upon them. They hired as many as 
twenty public relations, law, and lobbying firms in Washington, D.C., to convince 
53 Andrew Rosenthal, "War in the Gulf: The American President, Bush Halts Offensive Combat; Kuwait Freed, 
Iraqis Crushed," NY Times, Feb. 28, 1991; President Bush's address to the nation reported that it was not merely a 
victory for Kuwait and the coalition partners, but "a victory for the United Nations, for all mankind, for the rule of law 
and for what is right." "War in the Gulf: The White House," NY Times, Feb. 28, 1991, at JA12. The UNSR was 
retrieved June 20, 2001, from the World Wide Web: http://www.wwnorton.com/lenses/demounresolutions.htm. 
Retrieved January 9, 2001, from the Web documents: http://www.norton.com/lenses/leader profile#baker or #aziz. 
President Bush's letter can be found at http://www.wwnorton.com/lenses/demo_bush_letter.htm. 
54 Paul K. Davis and John Arquilla Deterring or Coercing Opponents in Crisis: Lessons from the War with 
Saddam Hussein (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1991), 13. 
37 
Americans to support that war. Dozens of fabricated video news releases were aired as 
news stories by television stations and networks around the world. In one instance, 
Kuwait's royal family hired Hill & Knowlton public relations firm to arrange a phony US 
Congressional hearing at which the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador, appearing 
anonymously, falsely testified to having witnessed Iraqi soldiers pulling scores of babies 
from incubators in a hospital and leaving them to die55. 
2.        Results of Kuwaiti Perception Management Campaign 
In the end, Kuwaiti authorities succeeded in gaining the support of the United 
Nations, including the United States. The United Nations Security Council passed 
Resolution 660 with the main objective to "restore international peace and security" if 
Iraq failed to comply by January 15,1991. As the conflict continued, Resolution 678 was 
passed authorizing member states to use "all necessary means to uphold" peace within 
the region. In this manner, the United Nations set boundaries (frames) around which 
Saddam Hussein had to react. 
D.       IRAQI PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN 
Understanding Saddam Hussein's perceptions of his opponents will help the 
reader to grasp why he followed the course he did. Hussein's perception of the war was 
quite different than that of US President George Bush. Throughout the waiting period for 
the United Nations deadline for withdrawal, Saddam Hussein continued to believe that he 
could avoid a serious military defeat. He, along with his advisors, was convinced that the 
United States would hesitate to use force against Iraq, and the crisis would turn into a 
long political contest of wills and words. He believed that his troops could hold out long 
55
 Retrieved January 9, 2001, from the World Wide Web: http://members.nbci.com/scone/hk.html.   See also 
http://meme334.freeserve.co.uk/hk.htm. 
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enough for the coalition to fragment, as Arab public opinion rose up against American 
forces. 
In order to keep themselves in power, many manipulators follow certain steps to 
seclude their victims. In Saddam Hussein's case, he attempted to do the following: 
Cut the Iraqi people off from the outside world 
Induce a physical state conducive for manipulation. Increase the person's 
emotional arousal 
Confuse the person through guilt, self-doubt, and pressure 
Use repetition of slogans and symbols, indoctrination, and simple thinking 
to alter the person's thinking56 
Use the "contrast principle" and other methods of influence to unite the 
Arab world against the Western nations of the coalition 
Since 1968, Saddam Hussein rejected other ideologies, going so far as to execute, 
assassinate, or intimidate adherents of various ideological organizations. Furthermore, to 
prevent exposure to unacceptable ideas, Baghdad limited Iraqis' access to external 
sources of information and continues to do so. The readings point out that by aiming at 
the emotions of a target, Saddam Hussein intended to affect the American populations' 
perception of the Bush administration's reasons for entering the war. Saddam Hussein 
was a culprit for stating how things "ought" to be. In his realm of reality, he purposely 
confused his opinion of how things should be with the logic of a situation in order to get 
the support of his people and other Arab brothers. In an attempt to gain public support, 
Iraq began an intensive and almost successful perception management campaign. Iraqi's 
PM efforts included defaming Kuwait's ruling family and portraying Iraq as the 
champion of anti-colonist, social justice, Arab unity, the Palestinian cause, and Islam57. 
56 Frederick Mann and Thomas Russell "The Anatomy of Deep Techniques-Part I" Retrieved January 18, 2001 
from the World Wide Web: http://www.buildfreedom.com/tl/tll20a.shtml, 14. 
57 Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13, JCS, 09 October 1998, 1-20.    This 
information was taken from the "Final Report to Congress", April 1992. 
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1.        Iraq's Targeting of the Arab Audience 
First, Saddam Hussein sought to link together the Arab world and to make Islam a 
common bond among the Arab countries. Stories about anti-Arab sentiment in the 
United States were frequent, especially after the devastating air attack on Baghdad. He 
believed that he was in an epic struggle between right and wrong, between the oppressed 
poor and the unjust and opportunistic rich, between injustice , deception and treachery on 
the one hand and fairness, justice, honesty and loyalty on the other. Saddam Hussein 
vowed to fight even after the retreat from Kuwait. He declared: "Victory is sweet with 
the help of God."58 Saddam Hussein's supporters shared his views about being victims 
of American and Israeli aggression. He attempted to intimidate his neighbors into either 
siding with Iraq or remaining neutral. He conducted numerous Scud attacks against 
Israel in an effort to turn the war into an Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Most of the Iraqi population was adversely affected by the 1990 embargo on oil 
sales. They became highly susceptible to newspaper stories. One newspaper, al- 
Jumhuriyah, reported that the United States, not the United Nations, had resorted to the 
weapon of starvation to divide Iraq and turn it into a new Rwanda. The editor used 
misinformation: "The embargo has banned all the necessities of life, including food and 
medicine." When in actuality, the UNSCR 660 provided exemptions for food and 
humanitarian supplies. 
Saddam Hussein pointed out that the withdrawal from Kuwait would not bring an 
end to the "real cause" of the war, the perceived international conspiracy against his 
regime.   In a face-to-face communication attempt to influence the story, he told Soviet 
58 War in the Gulf: The Iraqi Leader; Saddam Hussein s Speech on the "Withdrawal" of His Army from Kuwait 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1991, at A20. 
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envoy Yevgeny Primakov (negotiator) that Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait would be 
useless against the United States. He said, "if America decides on war it will go to war 
whether I withdraw from Kuwait or not. They are conspiring against us. They are 
targeting the leadership for assassination."59 
Saddam Hussein and his Governing Council felt that their invasion of Kuwait was 
justified. The story told to the world was that the borders were fixed by an imperialist 
power. No border settlement had ever been reached between Iraq and Kuwait. Iraq's 
southern border with Kuwait dates back to an agreement with Turkey in 1913, which was 
never ratified60. Kuwait was the administrative sub-district of the Iraqi province of 
Basra. Iraq was declared independent in 1932 and came under the control of the 
Hashemite family who also ruled Jordan. In 1961, Kuwait was given its independence. 
Iraqi troops invaded but left soon after British troops returned in 1961. Again in 1973, 
Iraqi troops crossed into Kuwait but again withdrew after occupying a Kuwaiti fort for a 
short time. Much of the disputed area included the Neutral Zone (on the border between 
Iraq and Kuwait), which consisted of 2,000 square miles that was negotiated in 1969. 
Both nations agreed not to lay claim to this oil-rich areaöi. 
Saddam Hussein felt that he should retaliate against Kuwait's aggressive oil 
production. During the 1980-88 war, Kuwait had increased its oil production by one 
million barrels per day in violation of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) agreements. Iraq claimed that Kuwait robbed Iraq of part of this pool of oil, thus 
59 Al Bassza, "the gulf conflict" Retrieved January 18, 2001 from the World Wide Web: http:// 
www.ciaonet.org/teach/cs/gafO lb.html. 
60 The Weinberg doctrine and the Liberation of Kuwait described this epic long struggle over the balance of 
power. Keeping Israel, our strongest military partner in the region, at bay, pleasing our Arab coalition partners, 
insuring that Iran did not emerge as the dominant power in the region, and avoiding increased world terrorism were all 
sub-issues of the balance of power question. 
61 Retrieved June 20,2001 from the World Wide Web: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/cron. 
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depressing the price of oil by increased production. Kuwait drilled laterally into the 
Rumaila oil field of which 90 percent is located within Iraqi territory. Prior to the 
invasion, Kuwait had extracted approximately ten million barrels of oil from Rumaila. 
This was 0.5 percent of its total production of 2 million barrels per day and amounted to 
approximately $2.4 billion during the eight-year war62. 
2.        Targeting the American Audience 
As Americans learned after the Vietnam War, citizens are often reluctant to go to 
war and suffer casualties without a legitimate reason63. In an effort to recreate this 
"Vietnam syndrome" amongst the American population, a high-level Iraqi official 
threatened that if war came, the Americans would come home not only in large numbers, 
but also in body bags. One newspaper story claimed that the Pentagon had ordered 
several thousand body bags and that the factory making them was working twenty-four 
hours a day to fill the order64. Another story claimed that the total number of body bags 
ordered for the Gulf War was forty thousand. Saddam Hussein hoped this tactic would 
compel the American people to demand US withdrawal since this war would be 
perceived not as a crusade to stop aggression but as an attempt to keep oil prices low; and 
therefore not a legitimate reason to sacrifice American lives. 
With the hopes of creating the impression of American weakness and decrease the 
credibility of US capability in the Persian Gulf, Saddam Hussein promoted a series of 
stories. One story sent the message that, as time passed, coalition air and ground power 
would be meaningless to the effort of stopping Iraqi forces.  According to reports, Iraq 
62 ibid. 
63
 Col. Harry Summers On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (New York: Dell, 1982) and On Strategy II: A 
Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New York: Dell, 1992, 15. 
64
 Martin Van Creveld The Transformation of War. New York: Free Press, 1991, pp. 305-55. 
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scattered soldiers of the elite Republican Guard (RG) throughout the country and would 
try to shield them from American bombing by keeping them in places such as schools. 
One newspaper story claimed that Iraqi troops had laid more than a half a million 
landmines in two belts north of the Saudi border, while holding another twenty million in 
their arsenals65. Other stories continued to build the Iraqi defense system. One story 
points out that coalition forces would be walking into a killing zone and would be met by 
the elite Republican Guard. 
3.        Iraq's Perception Management Tools 
Iraq used various tools of perception management to convey their stories.   One 
tool repeatedly used to generate propaganda was the media. It is difficult to measure the 
role the Iraqi media has played in maintaining Saddam Hussein's control over most of 
Iraq. Traditionally, the regime's information strategy included Ba'athist ideological 
indoctrination. 
Iraqi propaganda themes tried to promote the attitudes endorsed by Ba'athist 
ideology. They reinforce the regime's ideology among Saddam Hussein's loyal 
supporters. The themes persuade some of the skeptical masses to support the regime. 
Specific propaganda themes discourage overt dissent by limiting discussion to the 
government "line." The Iraqi media's propaganda filled the information void that the 
regime has deliberately created (and United Nations sanctions have reinforced) so that it 
can control information. s 
In an attempt to appeal to a cultural archetype, the Iraqi media used similarity to 
portray Saddam Hussein as the ideal Arab father. According to one sociologist, the Arab 
65 This article and other related articles were retrieved April 28, 2001, from the World Wide Web: 
http://wvvw.cas.usf.edu/envir_sci_policy/esprogram/espcourse/Ornar2.htm. 
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family is a cohesive social unit that works for the benefit of all, not just individuals; 
therefore, it was very difficult to shift Iraqi's beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. The father 
has both authority over and responsibility for the family. It is the father who calls on 
family members to make individual sacrifices for the greater good. During the past 
several years, the Iraqi media have emphasized that Saddam Hussein fulfills his 
responsibility to his extended family, the Iraqis. The media points out that he has 
subsidized food, raised the wages of government employees, and rebuilt the nation. 
Another tactic used in the Iraqi media is that the United States maliciously 
involved Iraq's neighbors-Kuwait and Saudi Arabia-in US neo-colonialist plotting. The 
Iraqi media alleged that these two countries were the puppets of the United States, 
obeying all of its orders. The primary, recurring complaint voiced by the media was that 
US planes used Kuwaiti and Saudi bases to spy on Iraq. The INA's 29 December 1995 
report was typical: US aircraft conducted 456 aggressive sorties between 11-20 
December, in addition to some reconnaissance flights [which] broke the sound barrier 
over many areas. 
4.        Results of the Iraqi Perception Management Campaign 
Saddam Hussein achieved the public support he coveted.   There was clearly an 
Arab dilemma. The Arab Nations attempted to solve two problems. They wanted to 
avoid being branded as hostile towards a fellow Arab nation. As a result, the Arab 
League was split over the condemnation of Iraq. On August 10, 1990, 12 of the 21 votes 
dissented and did not vote against Hussein66. Those who did not vote stated that they 
opposed the presence of the United States in the Middle East and that they supported 
Hussein's desire to link the Gulf crisis to the Palestinian question.   Furthermore, they 
66
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supported Hussein's grievances and opposed Kuwait's insensitivity and greed over oil in 
the area. 
Saddam Hussein's attack of Israel and Saudi Arabia failed to reduce coalition 
efforts and will to fight. Coalition use of information operations was a major factor in 
defeating Saddam Hussein's propaganda campaign. Saddam Hussein's perception 
management tactics did not bring the desired effect on the United Nations deadline. It 
limited his time to withdraw from Kuwait. Perhaps, he felt that he was being constrained 
and being manipulated. He countered, using the same method of framing the story, by 
making his options clear to the public. 
Saddam Hussein used perception management effectively to convince the US and 
allies that his forces would fight very hard. This caused much debate in the US Senate. 
A narrow 52-47 vote authorized the use of American soldiers. Saddam Hussein is a 
conscious exploiter of perception. 
In order to become an effective perception manager, it is critical to analyze 
information and not just automatically or "blindly" accept it67. Saddam Hussein felt that 
he could control the situation by driving events and thus, forcing coalition actions. He 
exploited the use of television, print, face-to-face communication, and the news. In 
comparison to coalition perception management, Saddam Hussein's story failed to 
convey the need for populace support. In the end, he lost the perception management 
campaign. 
Saddam Hussein's political strategy failed to influence the decision making 
coalition nation leadership. His credibility was destroyed when he attempted to create an 
67 The author suggests based on Robert Cialdini's study, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. 
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environment conducive for manipulation and at the same time, induce an emotional state. 
He was willing to place his men and innocent civilians in harms way. In the end, 
millions of people were left in a starved and desperate mode. Of course, the "father" of 
Iraq will come and rescue them, under one condition, that they follow him and his beliefs. 
E.        COALITION FORCES PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN 
'   The coalition perception management was aimed at several target audiences: the 
United States and European population, the Kuwaiti population, and most importantly, 
Arab unity, the Iraqi leaders and soldiers. It even attempted to affect Saddam Hussein's 
control over his soldiers in hopes that he would lose control. The goal of the PM 
planning team was to deceive Iraqi forces regarding Coalition intentions and to conceal 
the Coalition scheme of maneuver. The overall objective was to subdue the will of Iraqi 
leaders, causing them to act in accordance with the Coalition objective to withdraw forces 
that had annexed Kuwait. The story told was quite convincing, especially in their 
amphibious efforts. Coalition forces conducted an intensive deception plan to convince 
Saddam Hussein of Coalition intent to conduct the main offensive using ground and 
amphibious attacks into central Kuwait, and to dismiss real indicators of the true 
Coalition intent to swing west of the Iraqi defenses in Kuwait and to make the main 
attack into Iraq itself^. 
1.        Coalition Perception Management Tools 
Throughout the war, perceptual attacks included physical and electronic strikes on 
sensors and data links to destroy and disrupt the ability of Iraqi command to maintain 
awareness of Coalition actions or of their own force dispositions and status. These 
attacks were delivered via broadcast and physically in leaflets.   The message these 
68
 Joint Publication 3-13, The Joint Staff Special Technical Operation Division, II-3. 
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perception management tools conveyed was the overwhelming fact that the coalition had 
the military advantage. The perception that Coalition military intelligence and force 
could penetrate every corners of Iraq was conveyed via the leaflets, loudspeakers, and 
radio broadcasts. These PM tools also sustained the perception that specific allied attacks 
would be fatal and that the Iraqi soldiers should abandon their vehicles and surrender. 
The United States was a leading factor in the political perception that weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) would be used if Saddam Hussein ever tried to use WMD against 
coalition forces.69 
2. The Importance of Target Audience 
United States Presidents and other politicians have used audience involvement, 
cultural symbols, and images to their advantage in telling their stories. President Bush 
gave the media several reasons for the American invasion of Iraq and in the process set 
the perceptual environment. One frame used was to uphold the United Nations 
commitment to defend member states against aggression. Another frame was to maintain 
a balanced economy. President Bush also stated that the United States was preventing 
Iraq from monopolizing "all the worlds great oil reserves." Lastly, President Bush also 
claimed that Iraq was posing a nuclear threat. He stated that the goal of the coalition 
troops' deployment to Kuwait was to remove Iraqi soldiers and to prevent Hussein from 
using his air force as well as chemical weapons against the Shiite and Kurdish rebel 
forces. 
President Bush used words such as Saddam Hussein's "aggressive attack on tiny 
Kuwait" to emphasized the disadvantage of Iraq over Kuwait.  He pointed out that the 
69
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United States and its allies refused to stand by and allow such "disruption of international 
order and civilized ideals." 
Using Cialdini's principles of "social proof and "liking," Amnesty International 
as well as President Bush used both principles to prove that Saddam Hussein was evil. 
President Bush made many of these Kurd reports [about Iraqi troops pillaging the 
country] seem to have been true. A University of Massachusetts study later showed that 
the more television people watched, the more their attention was focused on fewer 
events, the less they knew about the entire situation in the Gulf, and the more they 
supported the war70. Doubts gradually arose whether "a line drawn in the sand" of Saudi 
Arabia and an economic boycott would bring enough pressure on Hussein to accomplish 
United States goals. 
Coalition forces framed or structured the situation. Again, leaflets, radio, and 
loudspeakers informed the Iraqi soldiers as well as the Iraqi population of the United 
Nations deadline. The information passed consisted of the United Nations resolutions 
passed against Saddam Hussein's "aggressive acts" and complete disruption to 
"international order and civilize ideals."? l 
The perceptual set of tools were used to induce guilt, fear, and at the same time, 
hope for a peaceful resolution. The question of credibility and believability comes to 
play an important role in influencing the Iraqi soldiers. The enormity of Saddam 
Hussein's crime made it easier for the international community to accept the United 
70
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States', and its Western allies' response to the Iraqi challenge. The suspicion of US 
foreign policy was subsumed by the urgency to rid the threat of their country. President 
Bush's administration knew that not only the credibility of the US was at stake, but also 
the trust of the international community. 
To present different aspects of Saddam Hussein's treachery, perception 
management planners used symbols and signs to influence the populations' and Iraqi 
soldiers' perception of real events. The main influential tools used were leaflets, radio, 
and loudspeaker in that order. 
Leaflets were designed to strike cultural and emotional chords among Iraqi 
soldiers. They emphasized peace and brotherhood^. The leaflet supported the themes of 
surrender, inevitability, abandon equip/flee, and the conflict and starvation of innocent 
people as Saddam Hussein's Fault73. 
72 See Figure 6. 
73 See Figures 12 & 13. 
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Live Together In Peace Not War 
"We are all brothers... 
neighbor Arabs.... 
we want peace 
Do You Really Want To Die? 
Figure 10.       Brotherhood Leaflet. 
As events evolved, leaflet themes transitioned to emphasizing the United Nations 
imposed 15 January deadline. After the deadline passed, leaflet themes shifted to 
emphasizing abandonment of equipment and desertion as well as the location and time of 
bombing sites?*. In a way, the leaflets told a story that coalition forces had far better 
equipment, weapons, and vehicles. 
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This illustrated Gulf War PSYOP leaflet portrays 
the two choices that the soldier has, 
fight and die for sure, or surrender and live 
so they can be with their family again. 
The instructions as to "How to Surrender" 
were published in both arabic and english 
on the back of the leaflet. 
The instructions were: 
"To Seek Refuge Safely the Bearer Must 
Strictly Adhere to the Following Procedures 
Remove the magazine from your weapon. 
Sling your weapon over your left shoulder muzzle down. 
Have both hands raised above your head. 
Approach the Multi-National Forces position slowly, 
with the lead soldier holding this document above his head. 
If you do this, you will not die" 
Figure 11.       Surrender Instructions. 
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Surrender Safely 
For your safety follow these directions 
1. Elevate your weapon's barrel to their maximum elevation. 
2. Traverse the gun barrel to the rear. 
3. Leave the tank hatches open 
4. Place your hands over your head and proceed slowly. 
5. Wave a white cloth as an indication of your peaceful intent or wave 
this leaflet. 
All armies of the Multi-National Forces understand that this 
pass shows your honorable commitment to peace. 
Figure 12.       More Surrender Leaflet Samples. 
"The 16th Infantry Division of the Iraqi army 
will be bombed tomorrow. 
Leave this location now and save yourselves." 
Figure 13.       Bombing Leaflet Sample. 
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Can You Say More Bombs? 
«S^iil .iiJyDt SJÄJ  -JJJS-S      Jk ..    .    ^ij*^   j>x—^  ■<*■' 
"Brother Iraqi Soldier... 
have you ever considered 
the power of the coalition forces?" 
Figure 14.       More Bombing Leaflet Sample. 
Leaflet themes were changed to adjust to cultural standards. For example, red ink 
had been used in the initial design of some early leaflets. It was later discovered that in 
Iraqi culture red signaled danger and should be avoided. The colors were changed to 
other colors. The leaflets ensured soldiers safety and health supplies if they were to 
surrender to coalition forces. They informed the soldiers that Saddam Hussein was not 
telling the whole truth about the situation. 
53 
Figure 15.       More Bombing Leaflet Sample. 
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sL>Ji  1P er 
Figure 16.       The Daisy Cutter Bomb. 
"Voice of the Gulf was the Coalition's radio network that broadcast from ground 
based and airborne transmitters, 18 hours per day for 40 days. The radio script or story 
was prepared daily and provided news to counter Iraqi propaganda and disinformation, 
and encouraged Iraqi defection and surrender. The objective of the radio broadcast was 
to demonstrate to Iraqi officers that their communications were vulnerable, to force them 
to use alternate channels, to slow down responsiveness, to increase suspicion, and cause 
tighter control of commanders by security forces. 
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Loudspeaker teams accompanied units to Iraq and Kuwait, broadcasting tapes of 
prepared surrender messages. One of the biggest themes broadcast was that if they (Iraqi 
soldiers) surrendered, they would be treated humanely and fairly. 
Some use of distortion on television was cited from the B-roll of a Scud being 
intercepted by Patriot missiles over Israel at night is better than a long, hazy shot of the 
shelling of Khafji75. There was so much action, drama and suspense in this Scud tape 
and reality so skewed that the counter-attack at Khafji was made less important than the 
destruction of an inaccurate missile. 
The feeling of self-doubt and pressure is used to induce guilt about the events 
occurring. Saddam Hussein applied the technique of "social proof." He instilled so much 
fear in his soldiers that no one wanted to disobey him. However, his attempted failed. 
Instead, social proof became one of the effective tools for the coalition forces. Leaflets, 
radios, and loudspeakers denoted to the soldiers that a peaceful safe haven was waiting 
for them if they headed south of Mecca. One video that was passed around chanted the 
Koran throughout its ten-minute duration. Saddam Hussein, the Coalition points out, was 
not following the teachings of the Koran. 
3.        Result of Coalition Perception Management Campaign 
Perception management was an influential tool in erasing the so-called 'line in the 
sand.'  It resulted in minimal coalition casualties while completely devastating the Iraqi 
75
 B-roll is footage of an event. Scud is the code name for the SS-1 missiles. Patriot missiles are US anti-ballistic 
missiles used to counter Iraq's Scuds. In the early evening of 29 January 1991, Iraqi armor and mechanized infantry in 
eastern and southern Kuwait attacked US Marine Forces, Central Command (MARCENT) and Arab Joint Forces 
Command-East (JFC-East) units at several points along the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian border. The Iraqi offensive lasted a 
little over four days, continuing until 2 February 1991. Known collectives as the Battle of Khafji, the series of 
engagements between Iraqi forces and the US-led anti-Iraq coalition represented the first significant ground action of 
the Gulf War. 
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RG causing most of the troops to surrender en massed. The coalition kept up activity 
that made Iraq think that the main element of the attack would be a sea borne invasion. 
This pinned down large numbers of Iraqi troops along the Kuwaiti shoreline77. The 
coalition relied on air power to wear down the Iraqi forces and isolate them in Kuwait 
and southern Iraq. When Iraqi planes fled to Iran and soldiers were blinded, the Allies 
were able to move around without revealing their dispositions. 
The actual battle plan did not have any amphibious assault7^. The Iraqi RG was 
blindsided by the coalition ground maneuver. Coalition forces gave the impression that 
the RG was not the target. The Guard commanders assumed that the Coalition VII Corps 
was moving toward Kuwait City. The RG's plan was to use the Iraqi 12 Armored 
Division to block this advance while they came down from the north. By the afternoon 
of 26 February, a coalition team consisting of rocket system, Apache helicopters, and 
fighting vehicles had three of the Guard divisions running. Other efforts included Navy 
feints and demonstrations in the northern Persian Gulf, Marine landing exercises along 
the Persian Gulf and Omani coast, positioning of a large amphibious task force in the 
Gulf, and air refueling and training activity surges that desensitized the Iraqis to the real 
pre-attack buildup. 
76 Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh The Gulf Conflict 1990-1001: Diplomacy and War in the New World 
Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press books, 1993), 398. 
77
 Roger Hilsman George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein: Military Success! Political Failure? (Novato, CA: Presidio 
& Lyford books, 1992), 130. General Schwarzkopf compared the maneuver to the so-called "Hail Mary" play in 
football. In the "Hail Mary" play, all the eligible receivers go way out to one end. When the play begins they all run 
like hell toward the goal. The quarterback takes t he ball from the center and throws a forward pass to the receiver who 
is least effectively covered. 
78 Actually, there would have been a landing had the "left hook" failed. 
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As Paul K. Davis and John Arquilla put it, there is a psychological tendency to 
rationalize information as long as possible within the preconceived mental "frame."79 In 
their example, the "frame" was that Saddam Hussein was bluffing, and that his 
preparations were merely to make that bluffing effective. They believed that much is 
accomplished from asking regional specialists for "predictions as well as itemizing the 
factors influencing nations' (or leaders') behaviors, and how behavior will change as a 
function of those factors."80 Goffman, Davis and Arquilla believe that a lot can be 
gained from viewing an event from different aspects or "frames."8i Approaching an 
opponent or group from this aspect will allow the planner to adapt to events rather than 
stick with an original strategy82. 
Since every perspective has a limited range of usefulness, a large repertoire of 
perspectives is needed in order to function in all of the differing situations of the Gulf 
war. First, the situation must be clearly defined to the target audience. Table (3) shows 
the effectiveness of employing Cialdini's "liking" and "contrast" principles conveyed 
through three PSYOP tools: leaflets, radio broadcasting, and loudspeakers. The leaflets 
and radios depicted Saddam Hussein as evil and selfish while at the same time portrayed 
the coalition forces as honorable and friendly. At the same time, these perception 
management tools informed the Iraqi soldiers that they stood alone in their effort to 
overtake Kuwait. They informed the soldiers about the economic sanctions placed 
against them. They warned them that coalition forces would bomb Iraq until Kuwait was 
79 (Davis and Arquilla, 1991), x. 
80 Ibid., 9. 
81 Ibid., 11. Davis and Arquilla believe that much can be gained from viewing alternative scenarios, alternative 
futures, or alternative opponent models. This, they believe, will generate the open-minded and wide-ranging 
discussions that lead to an appreciation of the "game board." 
82 Ibid., 11. 
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liberated. The leaflets in particular, told the soldiers the time and location of coalition 
bombing operations. They encouraged the soldiers to abandon their equipment and 
instructed them how to surrender to coalition forces. 
Perception management was a key element to the successful mass surrender of 
Iraqi soldiers and abandonment of more than half of Iraq's equipment^. Coalition 
intelligence determined that the Iraqi soldiers were kept ignorant of the situation and did 
not know about their disadvantage, isolation, and the United Nations deadline. Themes 
were based on analysis of Iraq's culture, preconception, biases, weaknesses, and strength. 
The US public perception was hindered when Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. 
Michael J. Dugan's story about the US strategy to bomb Iraq with Saddam Hussein, his 
family, and his mistress as the principal targets. Firing General Dugan only made the 
story more believable. It left doubts in the minds of the American people as to the real 
reason for American intervention. President Bush repeated that the US goal in the 
Middle East was to defend Saudi Arabia, to get Iraq out of Kuwait, and to make Saddam 
Hussein understand that aggression would not be tolerated. The strategy to achieve those 
goals was to impose economic sanctions. President Bush told reporters that the United 
States itself was not prepared to support the overthrow of Hussein, but hoped that the 
Iraqi people would unseat their leader. 
Finally, cultural background must be taken into account in any study of 
psychological warfare. Subject matter experts must be a part of the Coalition PM 
planning team. Davis and Arquilla made a good conclusion about culture specific 
models. They believed that it is "neither necessary nor appropriate to model opponents in 
83
 See Figure 12. 
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terms of culture-specific concepts such as the Arab mind."84 As all the supported works 
point out, it is important to include the study of background and culture of a particular 
opponent. But, culture and history should not be the only factors used in assessing an 
opponent's perceptions and behavior. 
F.        MEDIA INFLUENCE ON PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT 
The media are a very influential group.   They provide significant amounts of 
information but it is delivered within a very limited "frame," often in the form of a 
"sound bite." The transformation of this "framed" information into public opinion can 
generate attitudes based on few actual facts. These uninformed attitudes are dangerous in 
that they can lead to erroneous assumptions. Military leaders often use this as a weapon 
of population persuasion. President Bush used Cialdini's "liking" principle to portray 
Saddam Hussein as a modern Adolf Hitler in order to get public support for US 
intervention in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
Some recurring themes in Coalition newspapers: 
• The humanitarian situation (if it is mentioned at all) is the fault of Saddam 
Hussein^ 
• The sanctions-busting flights will open the door to smuggling weapons 
technology 
• Saddam Hussein received $37 billion for food and medicine^ 
The duel between Saddam Hussein's Scud missiles and President Bush's Patriot 
missiles created an interactive dialogue of images, which fit precisely within the credible 
news frame. 
84
 (Davis and Arquillal991, 78). 
85 Drew Hamre "War hath no fury like a noncombatant." Retrieved June 12, 2001, from the World Wide Web: 
www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2000/msg01247.html. 
86 Ibid. This quote was taken from C.E. Montague, writer and WWI veteran. 
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According to the Davis and Arquilla study, Saddam Hussein used the media as a 
source of considerable information. The rapid US buildup had gone on from some weeks 
to the point where Saddam Hussein felt that the US was just bluffing and would not 
attack^. However, the Koran best states it: if two parties of the believers fight one 
another, reconcile between them. But if one of them becomes aggressive against the 
other, then fight the one that is aggressive till he reverts to God's behest. Then, if it 
reverts, reconcile between them with equity and be just, for truly God loves the just. 
G.       POTENTIAL METHODS FOR ACHIEVING INTEGRATED EFFORT 
The value of inter-service and country integration has been recognized for a long 
time. For the United States, the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 
(Goldwater-Nichols) made significant strides integrating the services. In order to form a 
successful coalition operation, there must be a written document from which to train and 
gain knowledge. For a successful coalition, a joint international doctrine is highly 
recommended. 
H.       SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 
The International Coalition that the United States assembled for the Iraqi war was 
very successful in their efforts to liberate Kuwait. After six months of diplomacy, 
followed by six weeks of one of the most intense air campaigns in history, coalition 
ground forces, attacking along a broad front, crushed the Iraqi army. However, they 
wanted the war terminated without bringing any harm to Saddam Hussein. The author 
can only speculate one reason why no nation filed suit in front of the United Nations 
Security Council against Saddam Hussein. Maybe, Saddam Hussein's media efforts 
succeeded in spreading propaganda about the illegal use of coalition forces and their 
87 (Davis and Arquilla 1991, 52). 
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desire to kill him along with his family because of power concerns. If this story were 
true, the United Nations would be condoning the same vicious and aggressive acts for 
which Saddam Hussein was being punished. 
Most of the coalition success was produced by fear. The Iraqis' unwillingness or 
inability to use chemical weapons was due to the fear that the United States would use 
even worse weapons of mass destruction in retaliation. 
Success was impossible, on the other hand if a value or behavior promoted was 
totally alien to the Iraqi culture or challenged any of its core values, such as religion or 
nationalism, or was in conflict with its deeply ingrained perceptions, such as the values 
endorsed by the Koran which encourage the neutralization of any Arab brother who rise 
up against his fellow brothers. 
I. SUMMARY 
Based on the way the Iraqi media developed themes during the Gulf conflict, it is 
possible to conclude that propaganda assisted and still helped the Iraqi regime's effort to 
exert control over its people. To achieve a successful integration of Coalition operations 
leaders need to integrate the media with military operations. Without a collated effort, 
the media might compromise security or simply get the story wrong and inadvertently 
affect public support. Saddam Hussein was said to get his daily update of Americans 
opinions on the Persian Gulf War from watching CNN daily. 
Kuwait, the United States, and Iraq were all master storytellers. As Joint 
Publication 3-58 defines, a deception story must be credible and believable. Credible 
news frames the circumstances or context that create believable content or ultimately 
realities in news images.    The story must be framed to support the policy of the 
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leadership; else, it will fail to build public understanding or support. The key to 
disseminating false stories is the credibility of its sender. In the end, the reader(s) and the 
receivers decides who is telling the truth. Once this decision is made, the receivers will 
construct a reality that supports their beliefs and opinion and make it easy to remember. 
However, it never fails, for any significant action or opposition to occur, social proof 
must be involved. 
The story that the coalition would use weapons of mass destruction had instilled 
fear in the Iraqi's. It was fear and not virtue, which made it possible to keep the war from 
escalating beyond a regional conflict. In the end, our political leaders attempt to define 
reality. Not only that, the stories they tell the media, who in turn convey their rendition 
to us, define our perception of other nations. 
Someone who is objective and who becomes aware that the brain "constructs" 
reality will be much more capable of spotting the tools of perception management being 
used against them. However, the reader should be careful not to create self-deceiving 
bias(es). Perception management in the Gulf war weakened the morale of Iraqi soldiers. 
The goal to discredit the Iraqi military and reduce its capability and impede its maneuver 
was achieved. Perception management was a part of the tool set used to create doubt and 
confusion amongst the Iraqi lower ranks. It was a contributing factor to the overall 
success of coalition operations. 
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1990 Chronology of the Persian Gulf Conflict 
August 2 Iraq invades Kuwait. UN resolution 660 calls for Iraqi withdrawal. 
August 3 Iraqi forces reach Kuwaiti-Saudi border. The Arab League condemns Iraq. 
August 5 President Bush declares that the invasion "will not stand." 
August 6 King Fahd of Saudi Arabia meets with Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney 
and requests U.S. military assistance. UN resolution 661 bans the importation 
of Iraqi goods. 
August 8 American fighter planes arrive in Saudi Arabia. Iraq declares a 
"comprehensive and eternal merger" with Kuwait and annexes it as its 
nineteenth province. 
August 9 UN resolution 662 finds the annexation of Kuwait has no l«gal validity 
August 12 Iraq offers to withdraw in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian 
territory (namely, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank) and a Syrian withdrawal 
from Lebanon. 
August 18 UN resolution 664 demands that Iraq release foreign nationals who are- h«=ing 
detained in Iraq. 
August 21 
i 
Syria joins earlier Egyptian commitment to defend Saudi Arabia. 
August 25 UN resolution 665 strenathens the economic emhargo against Iraq 
- 
September 5 Iraq calls for the overthrow of leaders in Saudi Arabia and Egypt.                      j 
September 9 Joint U.S.-Soviet statement made that "we must demonstrate beyond any 
doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay." (George Bush and Brent 
Scrowcroft, A World Transformed [New York: Knopf, 1998], p. 368) 
September 13 UN resolution 666 asks for continuous information on the humanitarian 
situation within Kuwait and Iraq. 
September 16 UN resolution 667 condemns Iraqi violation of diplomatic compounds in 
Kuwait and demands the immediate release of foreign nationals removed from 
Kuwait. 
September 24 UN resolution 669 imposes an air embargo on Iraq 
October 29 UN resolution 674 reiterates the condemnation of Iraqi tmatmpnt nf fnrejgn 
nationals and demands their release. 
Table 1. Chronology of the Persian Gulf Conflict. 
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PSYOPS Impact on Surrenders 
Leaflets Radio Loudspeakers 
% expoed to PSYOPS 98 58 34 
% Believed PSYOPS 88 46 18 
% Influenced to Act 70 34 16 
Gulf War Leaflet drops (millions) 
Themes Balloon MC-130 F-16 B-52 Total 
Surrender 0.054 11.5 0.81 0 12.364 
Inevitability 0 4.3 2.3 0 6.6 
Abandon Equip./Flee 0 1.3 0.585 0 1.885 
saddam's Fault 0.09 1.8 0.535 2 4.425 
Other 0.186 0 3.3 0 3.486 
Total 0.33 18.9 7.53 2 28.76 
Note: It is extimated that 98% of 300k Iraqis targeted were affected by leaflets. 
Table 2. PSYOP Impact on Surrenders. 










Surrender 54K 11.5M 810K N/A 12.4M 
Inevitability N/A 4.3M 2.3M N/A 6.6M 
Abandon 
Equip/Flee N/A 1.3M 585K N/A 1.9M 
Saddam's 
Fault 90K 1.8M 835K 2.0M 4.7M 
Other 186K N/A 3.4M N/A 3.5M 
Total 330K 18.9M 7.8M 2.0M 29.1M 
Table 3. Gulf War Surrender Themes. 
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IV.    KOSOVO CASE STUDY 
People Differ Widely In The Facts Available To Them^. 
-Joe W. Straley 
A.       RELEVANT USE OF PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT 
The war in Kosovo, like the 1990-91 Persian Gulf conflict, was a battle of words 
and sophisticated weaponry. OPERATION ALLIED FORCE was unique in that it was 
the first time a United States information operations (10) cell worked with a North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 10 cell. During the 78-day crisis, NATO members 
and partner nations directly involved in its management were confronted with diverse 
political, military and humanitarian challenges. 
Information operations are considered to be a large part of the Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA), in that the RMA often views conflict from an asymmetric 
aspect. This asymmetric approach to war occurs over and over again amongst our 
adversaries. As Secretary of Defense Cohen stated in a speech, "Kosovo... illuminates in 
many ways how America and our allies and adversaries are going to approach the art of 
war well into the next century." However, unlike the Gulf war, information operations 
was not involved in shaping the environment in Yugoslavia prior to hostilities. Enough 
time was not given to manipulate the environment to alter the stories that were being 
promoted by Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic. 
Chapter Two points out that perception management is determined by the context 
of the conflict. In the case of Kosovo, the mass media and the Internet defined perception 
88 Joe W. Straley "The Media: Cynicism, Silence, Amnesia, and Disinformation."  Retrieved June 12, 
2001, from the World Wide Web: http://www.ibiblio.org/prism/julaug97/cynicism.html. 
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management. Both of these tools played a vital role in creating doubt about NATO's 
abilities as well as in countering other propaganda stories disseminated by Yugoslav 
authorities. 
Both NATO and Yugoslavia conducted extensive psychological campaigns. 
Serbian leader Milosevic had an aggressive media campaign. His campaign was so 
strong that NATO had to reconstruct its 10 department to counter its effects. Kosovo 
provided a wake-up call to the military that public affairs officers and civil affairs officers 
are an intricate part of the perception management team. This chapter focuses on the 
powerful impact of the media on military efforts during the conflict and what could have 
been done better to lessen the tremendous damage to Yugoslavia's infrastructure and 
stability. 
B.        KOSOVO WAR BACKGROUND 
Kosovo's history is rich in ethnic, linguistic, cultural, economic, social and 
religious differences. Serbs and Albanians disagree widely on the exact nature, origins 
and extent of their problem and agree only in admitting it has been around for many 
generations. Over the years, violence has moved from Slovenia to Croatia to Bosnia and 
then to Kosovo^. 
Following the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991 
Kosovo was an autonomous province of Yugoslavia, with a multi-ethnic government. 
Prior its dissolution in 1991, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was 
made up of six constituent republics (Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina) and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina). 
89 Chronology of events 1989-1999 relating to the crisis in Kosovo, released by the Department of State 
Washington, DC, May 21, 1999. See Table 4. 
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When Milosevic came into power in 1987, he took away that autonomy and implemented 
strict policies that excluded Kosovar Albanians from virtually all positions of 
responsibility. At the time, Albanians consisted of more than ninety percent of the 
Kosovar population90. In 1989, President Bush warned Milosevic that Serb violence 
would not go unchallenged. He warned Milosevic that the violence and forced expulsion 
of Kosovar Albanians would bring about NATO military actions. 
NATO announced that the alliance agreed to conduct a campaign against 
President Milosevic to: 
Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate end of 
violence and repression in Kosovo 
Withdraw from Kosovo his military, police, and paramilitary forces 
Agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence 
Agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced 
persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations 
Provide credible assurance of his willingness to work for the establishment 
of a political framework based on the Rambouillet accords 
NATO conducted one of the most advanced air campaigns against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). By the end of 1998 United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated more than 300,000 Kosovars had already fled their 
homes and, various cease-fire agreements were stalled. The Serbian campaign of ethnic 
cleansing had resulted in 226,000 refugees in Albania, 125,000 in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and 33,000 in Montenegro91. 
90
 Melissa Carr, Sherrie Glass, Rezaul Hassan, Lisa Misol, Marina Murvanidze, Kristen Pisani, Laura 
Thornton "The Pulse of Serbia." Retrieved April 20, 2001, from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.wws.Princeton.edu/~serbia/backgrnd.html or http://www.trathinmedia-org/bulletins/tim98-3- 
lJrtml. 
91
 "The Pulse of Serbia." Retrieved February 11, 2001, from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.wws.Princeton.edu/~serbia/backgmd.html. 
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Anti-Milosevic groups such as the Ushtrise te Clirimatare te Kosoves (UCK) 
stepped up its activities, the response of security forces from the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (Ministarstvo unutrasnjih poslova-MUP) and, increasingly, the Yugoslav Army 
(Vojska Jugoslavije-VJ) became more heavy-handed. These groups' actions, in turn, 
galvanized further Kosovar Albanian resistance to Serb rule and contributed directly to an 
increase in support for the UCK, to the detriment of the Democratic League of Kosovo 
(LDK). The UCK increased its area of activity until it controlled about 30 percent of the 
territory of the province. It was able to cut off access to most of the main roads in the 
province and even forced Serbs out of some areas. However, these successes resulted in 
further Serb reprisals on the Kosovar Albanian population. 
Diplomatic efforts to stem the violence were undertaken by the United States, 
Western European nations, and Russia. The international community imposed economic 
sanctions on the FRY. However, the Serbs resented and rejected almost all efforts at 
outside meddling. The Serbs created the perception that Kosovo problems were purely 
internal and were unimpressed by threats of Western intervention. In addition to allied 
intervention, all factions in Kosovo used media exaggerations or deliberate 
misrepresentation to both bolster internal support and shape international opinion. 
C.        ALBANIAN PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN 
Albanian perception management targeted the global population in hopes of 
getting outside assistance to their dilemma. It was also aimed at the Serb authorities. 
The LDK, led by former political prisoner Ibrahim Rugova, engineered a strategy 
of passive resistance to Serbian rule in Kosovo. Rugova and his supporters did not want 
to openly provoke the Serbian authorities because they feared the consequences of a 
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crackdown on the population at large. However, the LDK's perceived lack of progress in 
gaining political autonomy or independence gave birth to a radical armed resistance 
movement lead by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), or in Albanian, UCK. It 
emerged in public only in mid-1997, when it claimed responsibility for several attacks on 
Serbian police and began referring to areas of Kosovo as "liberated territory." The 
growth of the UCK was aided by both continued Serbian repression and an influx of 
arms, which were looted from state arms depots in Albania during the unrest there in the 
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Figure 17.       Map of the Region. 
92 See Figure 16 for a map of the region. 
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1.        Albanian Perception Management Tools 
The Albanians delivered their PM messages and themes through the media and 
refugee camps in Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro93. The Albanian media abroad 
regularly referred to Serbia as a foreign occupier, emphasized all actions taken against the 
Albanian population, and generally supported the existence of the "Republic of Kosovo" 
that was proclaimed by the LDK in 1991. The Kosovar Albanian media attempted to 
portray events in the province as a repeat of genocidal tactics used by the Serbs in Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. They also attempted to portray Kosovo as the main issue in 
world affairs, thereby generating the impression that outside intervention was just around 
the corner. Technology has made it possible for the usage of satellite dishes to bring 
updated events to Kosovar Albanians. On these international broadcasts, they saw that 
Kosovo was not, in fact, the dominant issue. 
Albanian Internet sites told the story of Serbian cruelty94. They warned its 
readers of the potential of being deceived or caught in a false reality by the Serbs. There 
were articles that pointed out Serbian intended perception management tactics. It pretty 
much outlined the target audience, the tools being used, and the intended results95. 
One article warned the Albanian population that the Serbs were using fear as one 
of their perception management tools96. Using this to their advantage, Detroit Free Press 
photographer Gabriel B. Tait's photos told the story of Albanians sleeping in their shoes 
93 The media includes print, radio and television. 
94 Albanians in Macedonia Crisis Center (AMCC).  Retrieved April 18, 2001, from the Albanian World 
Wide Web home page: http://www.Albanian.com. 
95 John Kifher.Kosova Crisis Center  "The Ravaging of Kosova (NY Times)" Retrieved April 22 
2001, from the World Wide Web: http://www.alb-net.com/kcc/ravaging.htm. 
96 Media and Publishing of Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Raska and Prizren.  Voice of Kosovo and 
Metopia was retrieved April 22, 2001, from the World Wide Web: http://www.kosovo.com. 
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ready to run9?. Other stories told of the Serbian mass murdering, raping, and pillaging of 
innocent civilians. Most stories pointed out that the Serbs organized all their acts of 
violence. 
2. Results of Albanian Perception Management Campaign 
The Albanians succeeded in getting outside help from the United States and 
NATO. The refugee camps were a major success in conveying the cruel nature of the 
Serbs. The stories that the refugees told the media were very convincing. The credibility 
of the Serbs objective was lost and replaced with the question: If the Serbs were not 
promoting ethnic cleansing, why then, were there so many refugees? 
D.       SERBIAN PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN 
Although Kosovo is predominantly Albanian (an estimated 90 percent of a 
population of about 2 million), all Serbs see Kosovo as the cradle of the Serbian nation. 
In addition, many Serbs believe that the communist system founded by Josip Broz Tito 
(himself of Croatian-Slovenian ancestry and therefore allegedly opposed to Serbian 
interests) deprived them of rightful control of Kosovo by giving the province autonomy 
in the Constitution of 1974. When Slobodan Milosevic assumed power in Serbia in 1987, 
he assured the Serbians that resolving control over Kosovo was at the top of his agenda. 
This was accomplished as Serbia gradually eroded Kosovo's autonomy and restricted 
Albanian rights in the province. 
Serbian authorities pressed a concerted propaganda campaign aimed first at Serb 
citizens and second at sympathizers worldwide. Their propaganda hinged on four 
messages: 
97
 Gabriel Tait was working on a story about a Michigan group's efforts to aid Kosovor refugees. This 
article and other related articles were retrieved January 22, 2001, from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.freep.com/jobspage/academy/kosovo.htm. 
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• Serbia's deprivations are exclusively due to the malevolence of the West 
in first ruining Serbia's economy and preventing its rebirth 
• A unified Serbian government, army, and people could rebuild the 
country's infrastructure in the face of embargo and severe financial 
shortages 
• Albanians were terrorists attempting to separate Kosovo from Serbia 
• NATO conduct was illegal and even a war crime 
The Serbs' belief that Albanians were impostors in their sacred homeland, 
combined with a pathological hatred, started a long line of arguments and fights for their 
rights. They targeted the Serbian population in Kosovo. Also, they targeted the world 
population in an attempt to validate their claim to Kosovo. 
The main target was the Albanians. Some observers believe that Serbia's 
repressive measures in Kosovo were designed, among other things, to provoke an 
Albanian armed uprising so as to create a valid reason before the world public opinion for 
a full-scale military intervention, leading to mass expulsion of Albanians and their 
replacement by Serb settlers. Serbian authority leaders arbitrarily arrested several 
Albanian leaders. These arrests were sometimes accompanied by torture or killing of 
civilians in order to intimidate and expel Kosovo Albanians. 
1.        Serbian Perception Management Tools 
Some of the Serbs perception management tools were harsh and unacceptable to 
the coalitions forces. One tool, fear, was used to force thousands of Albanians out of 
their homes. They even went as far as mass killings, raping and other forms of sexual 
violence. There was even a specific focus on killing young Kosovo Albanian men of 
fighting age with the aim of terrorizing communities. The Serbs insisted that most of the 
refugees fled Kosovo because of NATO's bombing. This random targeting of innocent 
lives was in hopes of producing the most potent weapon: fear.   In certain places, the 
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Serbs compounded the fear with humiliation. Elders were beaten or forced to make the 
Serbian Orthodox three-fingered sign. 
An important psychological factor in Kosovo since 1989 has been the 
demonization of the Albanian population in the eyes of the Serbs. This was based partly 
on religion, as the Orthodox Serbs hate the Muslim Albanians for being coreligionists of 
the Ottoman Turks who defeated Serbia in 1389 and who ruled Serbia for nearly five 
centuries. 
Serbian use of propaganda during the Kosovo Crisis 
Figure 18        Serbian Leaflet Sample. 
Note: the poor spelling of "collateral" 
Serbs in Kosovo were genuinely frightened, victims of their own perceptions of 
Albanians as terrorists. This view created a vicious circle: Belgrade media controlled by 
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Milosevic discussed Albanian aspirations in the worst light, as a threat to Serbian lives 
and property. Because the Serbs believed they were threatened by hordes of alleged 
rapists and murderers, the security presence was enormous. The security forces 
"discovered" numerous "terrorist groups," which reinforced Serbian fears. These 
anxieties were in turn encouraged by the Belgrade media to justify the repressive state 
apparatus existing in Kosovo. 
Serbian leaders focused on the world's population to tell the story about how 
coalition forces were being the actual aggressors. One letter published on the Internet 
told of the aggressor's daily targeting of national parks, nature reservations, monuments 
of cultural and natural heritage, rare and protected plants and animal species and other 
items of international importance98. The letter goes on to accuse NATO of not only 
genocide but ecocide of not only the Yugoslav environment but the whole Balkans and 
considerable parts of Europe as well. 
Serbian perception managers exploited global television and the Internet. The 
Serbian Internet site consisted of links to Albanian terrorism in Kosovo and Metohia.99 It 
consisted of an extensive explanation of their fight against terrorism. Some of the links 
claimed that Albanians were committing genocide against the Serbs. It pictured them as 
murders, rapists, and violators of international human rights acts. 
Serbian perception management attempted to create the perception of Serbia 
being the victim of western aggression and meddling. Since as early as March 1998, the 




Serbian media focused on the threat to the Serbian people in Kosovo through several 
main themes: 
Kosovo is an internal matter for Serbia 
Outside interference or mediation in this affair is not welcomed 
Albanians might expect some sort of cultural autonomy, not political 
The UCK is a terrorist organization supported by Albania, the United 
States, and other Western countries 
Kosovo  is historically  Serbian;  and Albanians are guilty of ethnic 
cleansing of Serbian villages 
The FRY wartime 10 was very effective. They focused their themes against 
NATO; that the Alliance deliberately targeted civilians. As a result, Serbian 
sympathizers flooded the Internet with sites denouncing NATO forces for alleged 
atrocities and invited Serbian citizens and other sympathizers to join themioo. Their 
confirmed bias compelled them to conduct computer network attacks (CNA) and other 
cyberwar events against NATO. This campaign was not effective in the US and other 
western countries. However, it provided Eastern Europeans with a link to information 
from Serbia. The messages contained stories and graphic pictures of NATO bombing 
campaign victims, Serb refugees, and news on Serbian refugees, and news on Serbian 
military operations. Some stories were fabrications, like the one describing the shoot 
down of an A-10 aircraft'O1. 
2. Results of Serbian Perception Management Campaign 
Having no contact with the other side of the story, Serbs' perceptions of reality 
became so different, selective and ignorant of the other side's perceptions that they raised 
the question whether a mutually acceptable solution was at all possible.   Living in a 
100 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Tan jug Notes New Internet Sites Against NATO 
Strikes," Belgrade Tan jug Domestic Service, 13 Apr 99, 1436 GMT, FTS19990412001460. 
101 "NATO   War   Crimes,"   Retrieved   April   22,   2001,   from   the   World   Wide   Web: 
http://www.suc.org/kosovocrisis/nato/crimes. 
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reality of their own, the Serbs had one distinct advantage over the Albanians: they need 
not bother with policy for the future of Kosovo, as their one and only decision-maker is 
Slobodan Milosevic. Although now nominally occupying the ceremonial post of federal 
president, Milosevic pulled all strings, made all decisions and made up all the mantras, 
which were then parroted by politicians and the media until they benumbed the minds of 
the chanters. The current mantra: "Kosovo is Serbia." 
Like the Kuwaiti authority, Kosovar Albanians, as in the case of then- 
predecessors, the Muslim Bosnians, tried to manipulate a desperate situation to then- 
advantage in the hope that outside intervention would help them accomplish their main 
goal of independence for Kosovo. Even though they damaged NATO's credibility with 
western media, their perception management efforts failed to prevent outside 
intervention. They succeeded in ending the air campaign. Their perception management 
campaign succeeded in preserving Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo as enshrined in 
UNSR 1244, giving Serbs the right to return their army, police, and displaced citizens to 
Kosovo at the earliest opportunity. 
E.        NATO PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN 
After assessing the environment in Kosovo, international and regional key 
audiences that may have an effect on the conduct of NATO or US information activities 
were designated. The primary focus was shaping the attitudes and behaviors of the local 
Kosovo leaders and population by disseminating factual information with related 
messages. These messages were disseminated with the intent of causing a motivational 
dilemma in an attempt to achieve desired attitudes and behaviors to support the NATO 
mission. 
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Perception management was primarily focused on shaping the attitudes and 
behaviors of the local Kosovo leaders and population by disseminating factual 
information with related messages. At first, the target was the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia's air defenses. 
NATO's 19 nations had a weak consensus leading into the campaign against 
Yugoslavia'02. The perceived frail nature of the coalition only strengthened Milosevic's 
media campaign. It seemed almost as if Milosevic set the stage and NATO reacted to his 
every move. NATO attempted to frame the war by contrasting Milosevic's "ethnic 
cleansing" to that of Hitler's attempt to cleanse Germany of Jews. They likened his 
policies to those of the Third Reich 103. 
One month into the air operations, NATO's goals were as follows: 
• A verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of 
violence and repression 
• The withdrawal from Kosovo of the Serb military, police and paramilitary 
forces 
• The stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence 
• The unconditional and safe return of all refugees and humanitarian aid 
organizations 
• The establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo on the 
basis of the Rambouillet Accords, in conformance with international law 
and the UN Charter 
• Stop the ethnic cleansing 
• Get both sides to agree to an equitable position 
102 Barry R. Posen, "The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy," International 
Security, vol.24, no.4, Spring 2000, 39-84. The key factor in NATO decision-making is unanimity. A 
unanimous vote was required to start the bombing campaign. 
103 Broadcast footage of Yugoslav authorities (including military personnel) shoving refugees aboard 
trains in Pristina. 
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1.        NATO Perception Management Tools 
NATO psychological operation (PSYOP) ranged from traditional leaflets targeted 
at Yugoslavian civilians, which had minimal strategic value. To disseminate information 
and associated messages, fliers, handbills, posters, and other print products were 
distributed amongst the population. The perception management team also used radio 
and television programming. The radio efforts played a key role in the success of 
disseminating coalition information. 
Much of NATO's perception management efforts were inefficient in their efforts 
to counter Milosevic's propaganda. At the start of the conflict, the coalition was ill 
equipped (both in personnel and material) to carry out a good perception management 
campaign with a staff of five. The media focused greatly on collateral damage reports. 
According to Admiral James Ellis, USN, commander of Joint Task Force (JTF), the 
coalition had "all the tools" to effectively run an information operations campaign104. 
However, the lack of integration of all "the tools" of information operations prolonged 
the Kosovo conflict. 
Television in Kosovo was controlled by Serbs, and in December 1997 the 
Albanian-language press was shut down, allegedly due to nonpayment of a debt to a 
Serb-controlled printing firm. The Kosovar Albanians get most of their information from 
foreign radio broadcasts. Some other popular radio stations were used to convey 
Coalition themes. The Voice of America Albanian-language broadcasts were the most 
popular, followed by the British Broadcasting Corporation Albanian Service. 
104
 Andrew Rathmell "International, Information operations-coming of age?" May 2000, vol 12/05. 
Retrieved June 12,2001, from the World Wide Web: http://www.ismc.sgov.gov7cgi-bin/search/slurp.pl. 
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As noted before, Milosevic controlled the journalists reporting from Belgrade. He 
and other Yugoslav authorities controlled the scene of the incidents. They made sure that 
reporters were brought to sites quickly that told a good Yugoslav story (such as in a non- 
collateral damage story, the crash site of the shot down F-l 17)105. When an incident 
occurred, the Yugoslav authorities quickly put out information, creating the important 
first impression. NATO, on the other hand, did nothing to counter these accusations or 
false reports. 
When they did respond, it was in such an ill-prepared manner that they only 
perpetuated the stories and gave Belgrade more credibility. The bombing of a refugee 
column on the Djakovica Prizen road is a prime example of NATO clumsy efforts at 
perception management106. When the incident first occurred, NATO denied any 
involvement (accusing the Yugoslavs). They made a press statement that allied pilots 
had only bombed military vehicles. The next release was an acknowledgement that one 
F-16 might have bombed a civilian convoy (14 Apr 99). This was again followed by a 
press conference focusing on the tape recording of the voice of the relevant F-16 pilot 
talking about the difficulties of identifying targets. This recording was later proven to 
have had nothing to do with the incident. Five days later, NATO finally came out with 
statements that two, not one, F-16s had struck two civilian convoys North of Djakovica, 
killing a number of civilian refugees. NATO continued to lose its credibility with the 
media as events unfolded. Another incident that decreased NATO's credibility was the 
May 14, 1999 incident of collateral damage in NATO's bombing campaign in the village 
105
 The F-l 17 was shot down one day after air strikes began on 27 March. 
1°6 Retrieved April 22,2001, from the World Wide Web: http://www.mfa.gov.yu/bela2/sadrzaj.htm. 
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of Korisa, in south-west Kosovo 107. At least 100 refugees were killed and another 50 
wounded when six NATO missiles hit this village packed with more than 500 ethnic 
Albanian refugees. In the case of the Korisa command post in late May 1999, NATO, 
again first refused to acknowledge that any civilians had been killed. This time, it took 
them two days to acknowledge the facts. 
2.        Results of NATO Perception Management Campaign 
By  delaying  information,  accusing  the  Yugoslavs  and  disseminating  false 
information, NATO damaged its credibility. In a way, their failures gave some 
credibility to the accuracy of Serbian reporting. Again, the Serbians controlled what the 
media saw. So, what was reported was only one frame of the whole situation. 
Kosovo showed how difficult perception management can be at different levels of 
authority. NATO was more reactive than proactive to many of the Serbian propaganda 
and perception management tactics. Perception management was more effective at the 
lower level, but they too had to revert to reactive measures because of NATO's tactics. 
NATO spokesman, Jamie Shae did an excellent job downsizing many media accusations 
about NATO's effort in Kosovo. The 4th PSYOP group was very active with leaflets and 
radio activities. 
F.        MEDIA INFLUENCE ON PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT 
Stories reported by journalists bring to view all sides to every story.   During 
coalition bombing campaign, the nightly news focused on whether the bombing was right 
or wrong, whether it was achieving its stated goals, and whether ground troops should be 
sent ini08. 
107 Retrieved April 22,2001 http://www.balkanpeace.org/library/gallery/korisa/index.shtml. 
!08 This paragraph addresses the contribution factors of retired political-military actors, also referred 
to as "talking heads."   Unfortunately, they can adversely impact operational events by expressing their 
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In the Kosovo war, military and political actors deemed themselves experts and 
interpreters of events. But, their credibility was put in doubt mostly because of 
Yugoslavia's convincing argument that there was never a humanitarian or refugee crisis 
in Kosovo until after NATO bombed and destroyed most of its infrastructure^. There 
were both political and media pressures on the military to show the results of then- 
actions. Most journalists were convinced that the prevention of "ethnic cleansing" in 
Kosovo was not NATO's main objective. NATO was questioned about their published 
statement of its "body count" of destroyed Yugoslav National Army combat vehicles in 
Kosovo. 
NATO was not only accused of releasing false information, it was also accused of 
passing to the press unverified rumors and exaggerated speculation about what was 
happening inside Kosovo. For instance, on 29 March 1999, NATO announced that 
Yugoslav forces assassinated Fehmi Agani (Advisor to Ibrahim Rugova) and five other 
militants. This was not true and two days later, NATO retracted its statement110. 
As for exaggeration, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schroeder, and the US special envoy, Catherine Bertini, all publicly claimed that 
Milosevic's forces had killed tens (if not hundreds) of thousand of Kosovo Albanian. 
The official count turned out to be 2,108 corpses exhumed from mass graves across 
Kosovo. Reports still have several thousand still missing. 
views since they have been their and done that in a previous life so they have some instant credibility 
whether they know what they are talking about or not. The public and our opponents may find it hard to 
make that judgment. 
109
 The problem of providing too much information on the effectiveness of weapons systems is that it 
can set public and political expectations that nothing can go wrong and when it does it is hard to explain. 
110
 Paul Quilles and Francois Lamy, Kosovo: Une guerre d'exceptions, rapport d'information, 
Commission de la Defense, Assemblee Nationale, paris, Les documents d'information, 90. 
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Who is to say that the media themselves were not manipulated into printing the 
desired story? Before the war, the Yugoslav authorities agreed to have several Western 
networks stay and operate from Belgrade in the event of a conflict. These reports were 
under tight restrictions and sometimes made under duress. One article tells the story 
about several reporters who were roughed up, interrogated by police, and, in some cases, 
expelled from Yugoslavia* n. Milosevic controlled what areas or situations could be 
photographed. For example, reporters were invited to report when bombs hit hospitals 
but were refused coverage of a destroyed surface-to-air missile (SAM) site. In short, 
even the most truthful western reporting from the heart of Yugoslavia was partial, and 
thus distorted, framed around events that Milosevic wanted the world to see. 
G.       POTENTIAL METHODS FOR ACHIEVING AN INTEGRATED EFFORT 
The United States took the lead in creating a coherent perception management 
team. President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive PDD 68 {International Public 
Information or IPI) made it possible for the establishment of a potential national 
information team. Chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and 
Public Affairs, the IPI Core Group consisted of personnel from the Defense, State, 
Justice, Commerce, and Treasury Departments in the United States. The United States 
incentives were not enough to counter the differing "Need to Know" policies of various 
countries. The fear that military operations data would be misused almost caused NATO 
to lose the information operations campaign. 
1!! For example, CNN lost about $1 million in equipment burned, destroyed or confiscated during the 
Kosovo crisis. Peter Johnson and Gary Levin, "Cost of War," USA Today, 29 April 1999, p 3D. Italian 
journalist Lucia Annunziata and French television reporter Memona Hinterman were both roughed up and 
expelled from Belgrade authorities.  See "Abuse of reporter outrages Italian," European Stars and Stripes 
18 April 1999, 7. F 
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An even greater challenge was trying to accommodate the many doctrines and 
different views as to how to handle release of information and dealing with the media. 
Throughout the conflict, most of the 19 nations issued different Public Affairs Guidelines 
(PAGs)112. They were not always consistent with each other, creating confusion at 
subordinate command levels. Maintaining unity through the conflict was a challenge. 
One newspaper article blamed the Europeans for exerting too much caution when they 
refused to allow the use of ground troops, restricting the number of targets, and limiting 
their assets in support of the campaign113. It almost seems as if NATO was not fighting 
against Milosevic but against the difference of opinion amongst its members and even 
worse, against the media. 
Countering propaganda and misinformation was a challenge. Direct refutation of 
false information, especially propaganda, was avoided because it only lent the 
propaganda credibility and risked potential loss of the moral high ground. 
H.       SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 
Operation ALLIED FORCE was successful in the area of military objectives 
(strategically, operationally and tactically). Although a few casualties do not define 
military success, the alliance sustained 78 days of around the clock operations, with 
38,004 sorties flown while losing only two aircraft to hostile fire114. However, they did 
not have a clear strategy for Kosovo nor did they have an integrated plan. NATO had a 
late and slow start in the perception management department.  Many critics argued that 
112 Public Affairs Guidelines are internal instructions detailing talking points for public affairs officers 
to use with the media. 
113
 Dana Priest, "Risk and Restraint: Why the Apaches never flew in Kosovo," The Washington Post, 
29 December 1999. This article was retrieved on April 12, 2001, from the World Wide Web: 
http://propl.org/nucnews/9912nn/991229nn.htm. The Washington Post and The New York Times Media 
and Journalist, 12. 
114
 Besides the F-l 17, an F-16 was shot down on 2 May 99. 
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NATO constructed an ineffective information strategy; even worse, many felt that they 
conducted it poorly. However, the alliance held together and proved its unity and its 
ability to resolve and defend its interest and values. 
Leaflets were ineffective because the Serb population had been desensitized to 
this effort through the constant propaganda of their own government. In Kosovo, leaflets 
were designed for populations within specific geographical areas and it was often 
impossible to deliver these without endangering aircrews. Risk aversion has always been 
a political issue that some day the military needs to put to rest. 
NATO 10 teams came together close to the end of the war. One great and 
historical repeated error was that end state objectives were not clear. The main issue was 
a military culture issue. When should the military go in, what should they do and when 
should they leave. It is never clear in peace operations. 
On the other side of the story, many argued that Milosevic led a successful 
campaign using the international media. His manipulation gave him leeway for a 
stronger information strategy than that of NATO. From his perspective, he won the war. 
One US officer agreed. Reporting from Macedonia, this officer claimed: "Milosevic is 
winning the information ops, the perception management. He's the underdog and 
everybody else looks like a bully ganging up on him."H5 The Kosovo war challenged 
the credibility of the United States and NATO. Testifying before Congress, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry H. Shelton, USA, and Secretary of Defense 
William S. Cohen commented, "the conduct of an integrated information operations 
campaign was delayed by the lack of both advance planning and strategic guidance 
115
 As quoted in Bob Shacochis, "Pens and Swords:   A Positive Dynamic for the US Media and 
Military," The Harvard International Review, Winter-Spring 2000, p. 26. 
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denying key objectives."! 16 Admiral James Ellis, USN, Commander JTF Noble Anvil 
pointed out that "the enemy was better at this [information operations]...and far more 
nimble. 117" 
I.        SUMMARY 
The Kosovo crisis is proof that, besides military planning, it is at least equally 
important to put together an effective non-military plan in order to manage Military 
Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) such as humanitarian assistance. It is just as 
appropriate and necessary to enhance activities of a preventive nature. In the context of 
perception management, proper planning is required before it is successful. Erroneous 
assumptions and inadequate planning handicapped NATO's public information effort. It 
was in no manner linked to operation cells at the beginning of Allied Force. 
The media can be an influential factor to the success or failure of perception 
management in any campaign. The battlefield has expanded to include the media. 
However, it should not be an instrument of the military and the government. If properly 
made a part of the operation, the media can be of value if not viewed as an enemy. It is 
most certainly a delicate balance between informing and operational security and the 
media. Of course, this is the military's decision to make; that is why PM should include 
public affairs officers who are knowledgeable about events as they unfold. However, one 
needs to be careful about how Public Affairs (PA) is integrated into 10. It is important 
for Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) to maintain objectivity and be perceived as an honest 
and truthful source of information.   They are the spokespersons for the commander. 
116 Secretary Cohen and General Shelton, USA, Joint Statement on the Kosovo After-action Report, 
presented before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 14 October 1999. Retrieved April 12, 2001, from 
the World Wide Web: http://www.defenselink.mil:80/news/Octl999/bl0141999  bt478-99.html. 
117 Admiral James Ellis, USN, Commander-in-Chief, Southern Europe (NATO CINCSOUTH) and 
Commander-in-Chief, USN, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR), "A View From the Top," briefing, 1999. 
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Perception management and manipulation are not a part of the PA standards of 
operations. Public Affairs are definitely a player in 10, but need to be protected from 
being perceived as untruthful or as spin-doctors. 
Commanders are no longer just fighting the enemy on the battlefield. Milosevic 
is a prime example of an enemy who manipulated the media to convey his reality. His 
stories were controlled, one sided, and at times, fabricated. The power of words used in 
the context of war is a critical component of the soft side of 10, with the help of 
technology. 
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1989 Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic strips Kosovo of autonomy. 
More than 20 killed in protests. 
1990 Yugoslavia sends in troops to impose control. Serbia dissolves 
Kosovo's government. Albanian legislators in the province declare a 
republic. 
1991 Separatists proclaim Kosovo a republic, which is recognized by 
neighboring Albania. In a secret referendum, the Republic of Kosovo 
is created, which only Albania's Parliament recognizes. 
1992 Ibrahim Rugova, who advocates a peaceful path to independence, 
elected president of separatist republic. 
1996 Pro independence rebel Kosovo Liberation Army emerges, claims 
responsibility for bombing police targets. 
April 1998 95 percent of Serbs reject international mediation on Kosovo in 
referendum. International sanctions imposed against Yugoslavia. 
July and August 
1998 
KLA seizes control of 40 percent of Kosovo before being routed in 
Serb offensive. 
September 1998 Serb forces attack central Kosovo, where 22 Albanians found 
massacred. U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1160 calling 
for immediate cease-fire and political dialogue. NATO takes the 
first formal steps toward military intervention in Kosovo, approving 
two contingency operation plans—one for air strikes and the second 
for monitoring and maintaining a cease-fire agreement if one is 
reached. 
October 1998 NATO allies authorize air strikes against Serb military targets, 
Milosevic agrees to withdraw troops and facilitate the return of tens 
of thousands of refugees. NATO extends the deadline for the 
"Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" to come into compliance with 
terms of the accord on Kosovo, giving President Milosevic until 
October 27 to honor the agreement. Belgrade agrees to allow 2,000 
unarmed monitors to verify compliance. 
October- 
December 1998 
U.S. envoy Christopher Hill tries to broker political settlement. 
Scattered daily violence undermines fragile truce. 
Feb. 6 -17,1999 First, inconclusive round of talks between Kosovo Albanians and 
Serbs in Rambouillet, France. 
March 20,1999 International peace monitors evacuate Kosovo, as Yugoslav forces 
buildup and launch offensives against rebels. NATO aircraft and 
ships ready for possible bombardments. 
Table 4. Chronology of Events 1989-1999 Relating to the Crisis in Kosovo. 
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V.      LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; 
supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without 
fighting118 
-Sun Tzu, The Art of War, tr. Sawyer 
A.       LESSONS FROM THE PERSIAN GULF WAR AND THE KOSOVO 
CONFLICT 
The overall purpose of this study was to examine the application of PM 
techniques within coalition operations. Both case studies show that control over 
perception is possible but requires extensive expertise in story telling; the use of various 
methods to convey that story; an ability to build and maintain credibility; and an 
understanding of the large audience culture and background. 
An effective PM campaign attempts to frame the situation to favor its supporters 
by conditioning facts, opinions, beliefs, and even inserting false data. It may evolve 
smoothly and naturally over time or be a quick reaction campaign to control a situation. 
The Persian Gulf War demonstrated that when used correctly, PM could be an enabler 
and force multiplier to 10. The Kosovo conflict demonstrated that PM is, indeed, an 
enabler to an 10 campaign, but it takes time to be effective. Both case studies show that 
PM, when used before a conflict, shapes the military context used in diplomacy. During 
a conflict, PM is used to sway the enemy to act in the manner favorable to joint force end 
state objectives. After a conflict, PM is used again to shape how the US and joint forces 
are perceived as well as the credibility of our leaders. 
118
 Sun Tzu, The Art of War trans. By Ralph Sawyer (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) Chapter 3, 
Attack by Stratagem. 
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This examination of the application of PM techniques has shown that coalition 
PM is feasible. There are, however, many pitfalls associated with PM, which must be 
avoided to help ensure successful integration of the PM campaign with the overall 
military operation. The areas, which, once mastered, help avoid the traps, include: 
1. The Role of Story and Storytelling 
Incorporating PM with coalition operations brings together subject matter experts 
who can create a better frame of the situation. As a result, the story told to the target 
audience via various media (Television, Radio, Print, etc.) creates a "spin" to the 
information relayed to the public. As a result, the context of a story forms the basis of its 
credibility. This study points out that the way in which the facts are presented determines 
who wins the propaganda or PM campaign for popular support and validation of then- 
cause. The method of presenting the facts entails a lot of psychological techniques that 
are invisible to the naked eye. These invisible psychological tools are a threat if the 
intelligence community, as well as the commanders on the battlefield, are not aware of 
their power to influence the populace and the military. In a way, a good PM campaign 
maintains order and structure to the bizarre events occurring around a conflict or war. 
A successful PM campaign will require experienced spokespersons. They should 
be versed in psychology as well as military science and should draw their knowledge 
from subject matter experts. But one of the most important qualities that they must 
possess is the ability to convey the information to the target audience. That is where 
being a good storyteller comes to play. 
2.        The Use of Media to Promote Themes 
Advances in information technology are allowing ever increasing numbers of 
individuals access to information at much lower costs.    Information, no matter the 
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medium in which it is carried, can be distorted to benefit its sender. The media message 
has become an important factor that must be addressed. The Internet alone, with its chat 
room capability, attracts thousands of users who take the information displayed at face 
value. The perception management team must be ready to deliver the right information 
quickly and accurately and in a manner that is as technologically aligned with the target 
audience. The case studies are show that PM teams must be able to react quickly to local 
situations; disinformation and information which runs counter to Coalition intent, can 
spread quickly. The PM team must understand how its target audience receives 
information (i.e., through which media) in order to quickly deliver themes, which support 
the theater objectives. 
3.        Credibility 
Perception management uses truth, fiction, credible and consistent data to portray 
the capabilities and intentions of both the coalition and the enemy's operations. Like PM, 
credibility is an international issue and takes time to become effective. For example, the 
various international news media in Kosovo each placed a "spin" to the stories printed in 
their newspapers. Credibility is in the eyes of the target. It does not matter what one 
thinks of oneself, rather, it is what others think. In a way, credibility breaks through the 
firewalls of people's bias (es) and allows access to the human mind. Credibility is central 
to planning a PM campaign; the perceptions of credibility and the will of Coalition forces 
to follow through on its commitments are essential to a successful campaign. Even 
though Coalition 10 conducted a successful PM campaign in the Kosovo conflict, the 
lack of credibility brought a lot of resistance to coalition operations. For example, the 
Coalition's choice of bombing targets was often questioned. 
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To be effective, the PM team must be truthful, objective and unbiased with 
information. The team has to know the enemy's stories and get "into their head" before 
they can attack an individual or group. In the Persian Gulf War, PM worked toward 
inducing fear in both the Iraqi leaders as well as their soldiers. Perception management 
weakened the morale and contributed to an overall success of coalition 10 campaign. 
Most important, there was advance warning of activity and time to prepare a coalition 
force to response to Saddam Hussein's threats. Coalition PM campaign did not want to 
use the fear factor in the Kosovo conflict because the situation was not as aggressive as in 
the case of the Persian Gulf War. 
4.        Target Selection 
The medium for conducting a PM campaign has expanded with the advancement 
of technology, creating an even larger size of target audience to reach. In the Persian 
Gulf War, there were a limited number of target audiences, mainly the Arab League and 
the Iraqis. On the other hand, the Kosovo conflict numerous audiences to reach: the 
Serbs, the Albanians, the European public, the US, and many anti-Milosevic groups. 
Besides the size of the target audience, there are regional variations of politics, 
ethnic and cultural values, religious influences, as well as different philosophies of life 
and as well as of the world (Western, Asian, Arab, Baltic). These factors affect the target 
audience and must be taken into consideration when planning a PM campaign. Like the 
coalition, planning for a PM campaign should consider the relevance of an individual's 
perspective of the operation since it can at times determine the best way to achieve the 
desired response to an issue. 
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Perception management is a delicate tool used to influence an individual or group 
to act in the desired manner. It takes careful study of the environment in which it will be 
applied as well as the target audience. It is always good to be able to reach the target 
audience directly. But, in the case of the Persian Gulf War, many soldiers were isolated 
from any source of communication and were reached via leaflets and loudspeakers. 
B.        RECOMMENDATIONS 
Integrating perception management with coalition operations is possible.    It 
requires a strong leadership structure and prior planning. The commander must be more 
sensitive to the threat of PM. It is imperative to understand who and what is the source of 
threat. A leader must know his adversary's psychology because the ultimate objective to 
conquer the enemy's mind and to dominate him. As Davis and Arquilla state, "it is not 
enough to have the relevant facts about the opponent's situation; to understand the 
opponent's thinking, one must to some extent internalize those facts and play them 
against values and ambitions, taking into account emotional factors and recent 
history. 119" 
The following are recommendations for integrating PM with Coalition 
Information Operations: 
• Develop a perception management team diversified with government, 
civilian, and military backgrounds for designated potential threats. 
Culture is an important aspect, but is not a stopping factor. It does have a 
deciding factor in gaining populace support or creating doubt amongst the 
soldiers. Take the Persian Gulf War PM efforts included quoting the 
Koran. 
• The Rules of Engagement for PM should be central and commonplace. 
One issue that must be dealt with is the release of information to the 
media.     Modern wars are no longer solely fought on the physical 
119 Paul K. Davis and John Arquilla.  Deterring or Coercing Opponents in Crisis: Lessons from the 
war with Saddam Hussein. (California: RAND National Defense Research Institute (1991), p. 77. 
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battlefield. The media and its stories severely affect popular support, as in 
the case of Kosovo120. 
• Establish a frame or objective. Some call this an end state objective. As 
Goffman puts it, once the frame is set, day to day events will not affect it. 
However, it is easy to come up with an end state, but it is quite difficult to 
incorporate it into everyday operation. Kosovo demonstrated this 
difficulty when the NATO bombing campaign often countered efforts by 
perception management teams, in particular, 4th PSYOP GROUP. 
• Understand media influences and embrace the press. Again, the media are 
not the enemy. They should be incorporated in keeping the public 
informed of the situations occurring in military operations. Public Affairs 
Officers should not fall into the trap of automatically responding to 
questions put to them by the press. After all, questions are nothing but one 
individual's perception of the situation. As Sun Tzu put it, know your 
enemy, but first know thyself. Remember, reporting in wartime stops 
when the soldiers go home but for peace operations, reporting stops when 
the media go home which is shortly after stability is achieved in the 
operation. 
Perception management must be integrated into military planning. It is in a 
learning phase with some of the defense universities. Land Information Warfare Activity 
(LIWA) and Naval Postgraduate School (NPGS) are a few organizations that are 
currently teaching it in an effort to implement PM with 10. As Joint Publication 3-13 
depicts, organization is a key ingredient to successful 10. 
Perception management is a flexible weapon of choice that is becoming a 
mainstay in US operations. It is associated with the term "force multiplier" and "combat 
reducer." PM can be effective in preventing conflicts and uprisings perhaps even wars; 
but it can only achieve its potential by means of its skillful applications in coalition 
settings. 
120 The author references humanitarian support efforts for refugees in Albania and Macedonia and the 
intervention to stop the killing in Kosovo. 
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